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Owens: Discovery in the IRS Summons Enforcement Proceeding: Less Certain

NOTES
DISCOVERY IN THE IRS SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDING: LESS CERTAIN THAN DEATH AND TAXES*
INTRODUCTION

The Internal Revenue Service, with its broad investigatory powers,' is
undoubtedly one of the most awesome of federal administrative agencies in
the view of the American public.2 This feeling apparently stems from the
Service's ubiquitous and almost mystical qualitiesO and from the shroud of
secrecy in which it frequently operates. 4 The Service's investigative power has
often been characterized by the courts as "inquisitorial power, analogous to
that of the grand jury."5 Understandably, the ordinary taxpayer may feel

EnrroR's Nom-: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the Fall 1978 quarter.
1. See Note, Constraints on the Administrative Summons Power of the Internal Revenue
Service, 63 IowA L. REv. 526 (1977); see also Baiter, The Role of the Advisor in a Tax
Investigation With Fraud Overtones: Analysis of the "Cooperation" Problem, 27 U. FLA. L.
Rv. 914 (1975); Duke, Prosecutions for Attempts to Evade Income Tax: A Discordant
View of a Procedural Hybrid, 76 YAs. L.J. 1 (1966).
2. Members of the American public are universally affected by IRS operations since
everyone is a potential target of investigation. Miller, Administrative Agency Intelligence
Gathering:An Appraisal of the Investigative Powers of the Internal Revenue Service, 6 B.C.
INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 657, 664 (1965). Furthermore, information gathered by the IRS is
often of use to criminal investigatory agencies and may even be employed against political
enemies or allegedly undesirable members of society. Id.
A well known example of using IRS information to fight organized crime is the tax
evasion prosecution of Al Capone, see Capone v. United States, 56 F.2d 927, 3 U.S. Tax Cas.
885 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 553 (1932); Capone v. United States, 51 F.2d 609, 2
U.S. Tax Cas. 1786 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 284 U.S. 669 (1931) (cited in Miller, supra,
at 664 n.26).
For other instances where the summons was issued to determine tax liability of a taxpayer allegedly involved in criminal activity, see United States v. Moore, 485 F.2d 1165,
1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9748 (5th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer on list of suspected narcotics law
violators); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 1971-1 U.S. Tax as. 19222 (8th Cir.
1971) (taxpayer on list of alleged underworld members); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d
207, 1968-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9518 (5th Cir. 1968) (third party summonee was defendant in
criminal antitrust prosecution); United States v. Richards, 431 F. Supp. 249, 1977-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9362 (E.D.Va. 1977) (corporate taxpayer allegedly involved with slush funds, kickbacks, and illegal payments).
3. See Miller, supra note 2, at 664-67.
4. The IRS is extremely hesitant to allow access to its documents and to provide information, as evidenced by its frequent non-compliance with discovery orders. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wright Motor Go., Inc., 536 F.2d 1090, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9605 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9648 (Ist Cir. 1970);
United States v. Duke, 379 F. Supp. 545, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9475 (N.D. Ill.
1974). See
notes 163-174 infra and accompanying text.
5. United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271, 1274, 1973-2 U.S. Tax. Gas. 9801 at 83,593
(8th Cir. 1973); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 737, 1953-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9467 at
48,213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 US. 864 (1953); see Comment, Income Taxation -Section
7602 Civil Summons-Special Agent's Admission that Civil Search Warrant Not Probative

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1979

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI

intimidated by the efficient technical machinery with which the IRS gathers,
sorts, and computes data determining tax liability and occasionally indicating
the need for criminal investigation. 6
One important power 7 of the IRS is its authority under section 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code to summon a taxpayer or third party to produce
books, papers, records, or other relevant data and to testify under oath
concerning matters which may be relevant or material to the inquiry at
hand." Although the IRS is authorized to issue such summons, 9 it lacks enforcement power. 10 This power is vested instead in the federal district courts.Moreover, the Supreme Court has determined that the taxpayer or summoned

of Bad Faith, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1147, 1150 (1976) (suggesting that court's frequent use of
discretion to truncate taxpayer's discovery contributes to inquisitorial nature of IRS powers).
6. See Liebowitz, Use of Taxpayer Identifying Numbers by Individuals, Business and
the Government, 41 TAxEs 31 (1963); Smith, Automatic Data Processing in the Internal
Revenue Service, 41 TAXEs 26 (1963); Surrey, Automatic Data Processing and Tax Administration: The Potentialitiesof ADP, 17 TAx L. REv. 165 (1962).
7. In recent years procedural matters have increased in importance in tax law as
evidenced by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§1201-1212, 90 Stat. 1522
(1976) which contained an entire title on administrative procedure. See notes 87-104 infra
and accompanying text.
The summons is one of the most important of these procedural devices and the one
most often used by the IRS to examine books, records, and other taxpayer data. The IRS
Summons: Vital Enforcement Machinery or a Threat to Constitutional Rights? [1978] 9
STAND. FED. TAx REP. (CCH) 18325 [hereinafter cited as IRS Summons]. In recent years
there has been a "veritable barrage" of cases and major revision of the law regarding the
summons. Id.
8, I.R.C. §7602 reads: "EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES. For the
purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been
made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability
at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal
revenue tax, or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material
to such inquiry; (2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act,
or any officer or employee of such person or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax
or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem
proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the
summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such
testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry, and (3) To take
such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to
such inquiry."
9. I.R.C. §7608(b) authorizes any criminal investigator of the Intelligence Division or
Internal Security Division who is charged with the enforcement of any of the criminal
provisions related to internal revenue to serve subpoenas and summonses.
10. Frequently, the summonee voluntarily complies. For a discussion of whether to
cooperate with the special agent, see Balter, supra note I, at 916-17; Baiter, Should Your
Client "Cooperate" When Charged Wzth Tax Fraud?, 29 TAXES 290 (1951).
11. I.R.C. §7604(a): "JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT.-If any person is
summoned under the internal revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books,
papers, records, or other data, the United States district court for the district in which
such person resides or is found shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel
such attendance, testimony, or production of books, papers, records, or other data."
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party must receive an adversary hearing

2

during which he may challenge the

summons on "any appropriate ground."'13 Because the enforcement proceedings are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,34 the discovery
provisions provided therein may be made available to the challenging taxpayer or third party. Discovery is discretionary with the trial court,' 5 how-

ever, and the courts generally disallow or severely limit discovery.' 6
The Supreme Court has recently redefined and effectively narrowed one

of the major grounds employed by the taxpayer or third party to challenge the
summons in United States v. LaSalle National Bank,1 which set out revised

guidelines for summons enforcement. This note will examine the grounds on
which a taxpayer or third party may challenge the summons and the availability and scope of discovery to the challenging party. Emphasis will be
placed on the implications of the LaSalle decision on these issues. Following
an analysis of prior case law concerning discovery, the note will suggest possible
guidelines for determining the scope of discovery whch should be permitted
by balancing the taxpayer's' 8 right to a meaningful adversary hearing against

the government's interest in expediting the procedure.

12. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 525, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173 at
85,761 (1971); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9858 at 94,233
(1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19202 at 91,450 (1964).
Much disagreement exists as to what constitutes the Reisman-Powell mandated adversary
hearing. Some courts decide whether to allow discovery based upon whether it seems
necessary for an adequate adversary hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggeiro, 300 F.
Supp. 968, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9623 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (appropriate process of I.R.C.
§7604(a) met when taxpayer afforded an "adversary" hearing. Powell falls short of requiring a panoply of discovery and pretrial incident to the normal civil action).
Whether the adversary hearing need be evidentiary is debated. See, e.g., United States
v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9402 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.. Tax Cas. 9648 (1st Cir. 1970).
13. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19173 at 85,761
(1971); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58, 1964-2 U.. Tax Cas. 9858 at 94,233 (1964)
(citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.6. 440, 449, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19202 at 91, 451 (1964)).
14. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 n.18, 1964-2 US.
Tax Cas. 9858 at 94,233 n.18 (1964) (citing Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co. 128 F.2d 731, 7,4,
1942-2 US. Tax Cas. 9521 at 10,213 (9th Cir. 1942)).
15. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 528-29, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173
at 85,762 (1971); United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 42, 1971-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9649 at 87,553
(9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Ahmanson, 415 F.2d 785, 787, 1969-2 U.S. Tax. Gas. 9572
at 85,521 (9th Cir. 1969).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Motor Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1090, 1976-2 US. Tax
Gas. 9605 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Interstate Tool & Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59, 1975-2
U.S. Tax Gas. 9870 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2
U.S. Tax Gas. 9733 (5th Cir. 1969). See also cases cited, note 15 supra.
17. 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 US. Tax Gas. 9501 (1978).
18. A summons may be issued to the taxpayer under investigation or to a third party.
The summoned party may always challenge enforcement in the district court and frequently the taxpayer under investigation may intervene. The term "taxpayer" is frequently
used in this Note because he would usually be the challenging party. However, the same
rights and privileges would apply to a third party summonee.
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PURPOSES FOR WHICH AN IRS SUMMONS MAY BE ISSUED

Despite its civil nature, the summons1 9 is issued frequently to obtain information which may relate to the taxpayer's criminal liability.2 0 This is because an IRS investigation generally serves a dual purpose - the determination of civil liability and the investigation of potential criminal liability.2 1
The IRS has stressed 2 2 and the courts have agreed, 23 that it is virtually impossible to separate these two functions because an investigation into the
possibility of criminal tax fraud necessarily includes a determination of civil
tax liability. 24 The Service is required by statute2 5 to investigate the possibility
of tax fraud and to refer appropriate cases to the Department of Justice
for criminal prosecution. 26 To determine whether such a referral is justified,
the IRS must first investigate tax liability. 2 7 It is for this dual purpose that
the summons is issued when fraud is suspected. 28 A situation in which a civil
purpose did not co-exist with a criminal tax fraud investigation would be very
unusual.

29

When fraud is suspected, a special agent is assigned to work with the
revenue agent ° in the investigation. 31 The dual purpose then exists until
19. See United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 1953-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9591 (D.
Mass. 1953); Duke, supra note 1, at 42; Note supra note 1 at 539. "The danger clearly exists
then of abuse of an investigative tool which by its language and interpretation should be
considered primarily civil in nature, but which is in fact being used for criminal investigation without the traditional safeguards of probable cause or informed consent." Id.
20. The summons is generally issued only in connection with a full scale investigation.
Brief for Respondents at 28 n.ll, Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax
Gas. 19173 (1971).
21. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 2363, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at
84,581; Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. %9159 at 80,187-88
(1973). See generally Duke, supra note 1.
22. See Brief for Respondents at 8-9, Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 19173 (1971).
23. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
19501 (1978).
24. Id. at 2363, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,580-81.
25. I.R.C. §7601(a) requires the Secretary to "inquire after and concerning all persons ...
who may be liable to pay internal revenue tax." I.R.C. §§7206-7207 subject to taxpayer who
submits a fraudulent tax return to criminal penalties; thus a referral to the Justice Department becomes necessary.
26. The Intelligence Division "enforces the Criminal Statutes applicable to income . . .
[and other] tax laws . . . by developing information concerning alleged criminal violations
thereof ..
" Brief for Petitioners at 17, United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357,
1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19501 (1978) (quoting Internal Revenue Service Organization and
Functions §1118.6, 39 Fed. Reg. 11,607 (1974)).
27. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9501 (1978).
28. See id. at 2363, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 84,580-81.
29. Id. at 2366, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,583. "For a fraud investigation to be solely
criminal in nature would require an extraordinary departure from the normally inseparable
goals of examining whether the basis exists for criminal charges and for the assessment of
civil penalties." Id.
30. Representatives of the IRS Intelligence Division are known as special agents.
Representatives of the Audit Division are revenue agents. Collection Division representatives
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either the special agent doses the case or the matter is forwarded for prosecution.32 The IRS generally suspends its civil investigation during the pendancy

of the criminal prosecution.8 3

Upon receiving a tax summons, 34 the summoned party is legally required
to appear at the designated time and place 35 but may refuse to comply if this
refusal is in good faith.36 Generally, a good faith refusal is recognized when

the summoned party intends to challenge enforcement of the summons for
37
lack of good faith or proper purpose on the part of the IRS.

are called revenue officers. Galen, Discovery and Privilege in Tax Cases; What to do When
the Special Agent Arrives, 28 U.S. CAL. TAX INST. 833, 836 (1976).
A revenue officer explained that he represents the civil enforcement arm while the
revenue agent represents the investigative arm. Interview with L. D. Mathis, Revenue
Officer, in Gainesville, Fla. (Oct. 23, 1978).
31. See Brief for the Petitioners at 16-20, United States v. LaSalle Natl Bank, 98 S. Ct.
2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19501 (1978).
The IRS Audit Technique Handbook for Internal Revenue Agents, §10(91) provides
that if the revenue agent discovers indications of fraud during his audit examination, he
should suspend his activities at the earliest opportunity without disclosing the reason for
the suspension to the taxpayer, his representative, or employees. He must then refer the
case to the Intelligence Division. "At the earliest opportunity" is defined to mean "at the
earliest point after discovering firm indications of fraud." Id.
In a recent case, United States v. Toussaint, No. H-78-86, (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 1978),
evidence of admissions made by taxpayer Toussaint, himself an IRS revenue agent, to the
revenue agent investigating his 1976 returns, was suppressed because of a violation of this
rule.
Toussaint had claimed a $190,000 tax deduction for a loss resulting from the alleged theft
of a Picasso painting from his home. The painting was unappraised and uninsured. Toussaint
claimed his grandfather had given him the painting. However, his grandfather had left
no estate at his death and filed no gift tax on the painting. The district court found that
the revenue agent had a firm indication of fraud on his first interview with Toussaint although he had five more interviews plus collateral contacts with police, art appraisers and
Toussaint's mother over a six month period before referring the case. The court felt that
if a special agent had been assigned immediately as required by IRS regulations, the
taxpayer probably would not have been so cooperative in giving information. Therefore,
the agent deceived Toussaint into believing the investigation was routine and no criminal
charges were contemplated. This overzealousness of the revenue agent resulted in suppression
of the evidence he had gained after the first interview and until he finally properly referred
the case to a special agent. Id.
32. Authority to prosecute for tax evasion is reserved to the Department of Justice by

28 U.S.C. §547(l) (1976).
33. Galen, supra note 30, at 838. Galen suggests that the rationale behind such suspension is to avoid having the civil case precede the criminal case, thus educating the taxpayer

as to the issues in the criminal prosecution. Id. at 838-39.
34. Although the revenue agent and special agent work together, the special agent
assumes the primary responsibility for the investigation and takes control. United States v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 2359 n.l, 1978-2 US. Tax Cas. at 84,576 n.1 (1978).
Generally, special agents carry summonses and can issue one on the spot. Thus, summonses
are sometimes referred to as "pocket summonses." Note, Taxation: IRS Use of John Doe
Administrative Summonses, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 465, 469 (1977).

35. I.R.C. §7605(a).
36. Courts have generally held that the summoned party cannot be held in contempt
so long as the refusal is in good faith. See, e.g., United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845,
1969-2 U.S. Tax Gas. %9733 (5th Cir. 1969).

37. Id. at 853, U.S. Tax Cas. 9733 at 86,069.
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ProperPurpose
The Supreme Court has developed criteria 8 for ascertaining whether a
summons has been issued in good faith and pursuant to a proper purpose.39
In United States v. Powell,40 the Court first enumerated the requirements for
proper summons issuance. 41 The Service must show that: (1) the investigation
is being conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, (2) the inquiry may be
relevant to that purpose, (3) the information sought is not already in the
Commissioner's possession, and (4) the administrative steps established for
the issuance of the summons have been followed. 42 The Powell Court held
that as long as a proper purpose is shown, the Commissioner need not show
probable cause to suspect fraud unless the taxpayer has introduced substantial evidence indicating that enforcement would result in an abuse of
the court's process. 43 Consequently, a court may inquire into improper governmental purpose to prevent such an abuse. 44 The Court, however, placed both
the burden of establishing that the IRS failed to meet the necessary criteria
for proper purpose and the burden of proving improper purpose on the
45
taxpayer.
The Powell majority did not create new law but instead attempted to
clarify some of the prior confusion surrounding summons enforcement. As
early as 1869, a summons was enforced when issued in good faith and in
compliance with instructions from the Commissioner. 46 The statutory pro38. The Court developed guidelines for summons enforcement in response to varying
judicial interpretations. See, e.g., Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185, 1960-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9104
(1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960) (as long as IRS has proper purpose, other
purposes don't vitiate its authority); Boren v. Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 1957-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9246 (9th Cir. 1956) (sufficient showing of possibility of fraud to require production of
corporate records); In re Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212, 1962-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9328 (E.D. Pa.
1962) (summons issued several days before criminal prosecution set for trial was not enforced as clearly issued to aid in Government's prosecution); United States v. O'Connor,
118 F. Supp. 248, 1953-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19591 (D. Mass. 1953) (court refused to enforce
summons where taxpayer already indicted as against public policy and a perversion of
statutory power).
39. The Supreme Court has progressively attempted to define and clarify these requirements in the following four major decisions: United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
1971-I U.S. Tax Cas. 19173 (1971); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 1964-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9858 (1964); Reisman v. Caplin, 376 U.S. 440, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19202 (1964).
40. 379 U.S. 48, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9858 (1964).
41. The LaSalle Court included the Powell requirements in its updated enforcement requirements. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 2368, 1978-2 US. Tax Cas. at

84,584.
42. 379 U.S. at 57-58, 1964- U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,233.
43. Id. at 51, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,230. The Court states that the substantial
question indicating such abuse must be "predicated on more than the fact of re-examination
and the running of the statute of limitations on ordinary tax liability." Id.
44. Id. at 58, 1964-2 US. Tax Gas. at 94,233.
45. Id. at 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,233 (cited with approval in Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517, 527, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173 at 85,762 (1971)).
46. See, e.g., Stanwood v. Green, 22 F. Cas. 1077, 1079 (N.D. Miss. 1870); In re Meador,
16 F. Cas. 1294, 1296 (N.D. Ga. 1869).
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visions authorizing the issuance of the summons, then contained in section
14 of the 1864 Act,47 have remained a part of the Internal Revenue Code and

have been consistently enforced.
ImproperPurpose
The ground on which the majority of taxpayers challenge summons enforcement was not discussed by the Powell majority 5 Although the summons
may be issued for the dual purpose of investigating civil and criminal liability,
it may not be used solely to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution. 49 Thus,
sole criminal purpose is a recognized defense against summons enforcement. 50
Understandably, the interpretation of "solely for use in a criminal prosecu51
tion" or "sole criminal purpose" has been the subject of much litigation.
The Supreme Court has recently re-examined and narrowed the scope of this
defense in the LaSalle52 decision, the implications of which will be analyzed
in detail later in this note.
47. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, §14, 13 Stat. 226 (1864) reads in part: "And if any
person, on being notified or required as aforesaid, shall refuse or neglect to give such list
or return within the time required as aforesaid, or if any person shall not deliver a monthly
or other list or return without notice at the time required by law, or if any person shall
deliver or disclose to any assessor or assistant assessor any list, statement, or return, which,
in the opinion of the assessor, is false or fraudulent, or contains any understatement or
undervaluation, it shall be lawful for the assessor to summon such person, his agent, or
other person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the trade or business of such person, or any other persons as he may deem
proper, to appear before such assessor and produce such book, at a time and place therein
named, and to give testimony or answer interrogatories under oath or affirmation respecting
any objects liable to duty or tax as aforesaid, or the lists, statements, or returns thereof,
or any trade, business, or profession liable to any tax or license as aforesaid."
48. Although Powell did not expressly mention the defense of sole criminal purpose,
it could be implied since a sole criminal purpose evidences a lack of I.R.S. good faith.
49. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 1964-1 U;. Tax Cas. 9802 at 91,451
(1964). Reisman has been cited in numerous subsequent cases for this proposition. See, e.g.,
note 59 infra and accompanying text.
50. "pT]he witness may challenge the summons on any appropriate ground. This would
include, as the circuits have held, the (defenses] that the material is sought for the improper
Reisman v. Caplin,
purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution.
375 U.S. 440, 449, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302 at 91,451 (1964).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 648 F.2d 1347, 1977-1 US. Tax Cas.
9263 (9th Cir. 1977) (upheld enforcement even though special agent and district director
recommended prosecution because recommendation to Justice Department had not yet
occurred); United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9626 (9th Cir. 1975)
(denied enforcement, affirming that sole purpose of summons was to supplement previous
criminal search warrant and therefore, solely to prepare criminal case against taxpayer);
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9210 (6th Cir. 1973)
(standard used was whether sole purpose of issuance was to obtain evidence for a criminal
prosecution); United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893, 1973-1 UjS. Tax Cas. 19122 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (if agent had already formed a "firm purpose" to recommend criminal prosecution summons would be issued in bad faith); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d 117, 1971-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9222 (8th Cir. 1971) (summons can only be successfully challenged when
criminal prosecution has been recommended and is pending at time of issuance).
52. 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 US. Tax Cas. T9501 (1978). See text accompanying notes 7386 infra.
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The Powell majority did, however, anticipate the questions which would
arise in defining improper purpose. The Court suggested that an improper
purpose would exist if the summons were issued to harass the taxpayer, to
pressure him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting
on the good faith of the investigation. 53 Thus, according to the Powell majority's rationale the key element for a showing of improper purpose appeared
to be a lack of good faith.
Criminal Purpose Doctrine. Although it was well established that the
summons would not be enforced if issued solely to gather criminal evidence, "
disagreement long characterized court decisions dealing with two previously
unsettled issues."5 The first problem evolved when the IRS had both a proper
purpose, that of determining civil tax liability, and an allegedly improper
purpose, that of gathering evidence of a criminal nature.." Assuming that
the court found enforcement proper when a dual purpose existed, a second
problem arose in recognizing the point where the criminal purpose became
7
so dominant that use of the summons became unjustified.5
An important case purporting to clarify both issues was Donaldson v.
United States.58 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court compounded the existing
confusion by setting out two distinguishable rulings that resulted in an unclear opinion. First, the majority agreed that the summons should not be enforced when the material sought was for "the improper purpose of obtaining
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution." 59 The Court held, however, that

53. 379 U.S. at 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,233 (1964).
54. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9202 (1964); Boren v.
Tucker, 239 F.2d 767, 1957-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9240 (9th Cir. 1956).
55. These two issues were finally resolved in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98
S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978). See text accompanying notes 73-86 infra.
56. Courts most often held that if a valid civil purpose existed, the coexistence of a
criminal purpose was irrelevant so long as no referral to the Justice Department had been
made. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggeiro, 425 F.2d 1069, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9381 (9th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 415 F.2d 1284, 1969-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9625 (1969); United States v. DeGrosa, 405 F.2d 926, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9154
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 973 (1969).
57. Courts varied between two extremes. For example, in United States v. Wall Corp.,
475 F.2d 893, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9122 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court adopted the "firm
purpose" test. When the agent had formed a firm purpose in his mind to recommend prosecution, the summons was no longer enforceable. At the other extreme were the courts
which held that the summons was unenforceable until a formal referral to the Justice
Department had been made.
58. 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173 (1971). In the Donaldson case, a summons
was issued to taxpayer Donaldson's former employers, Joseph J. Mercurio and Acme Circus
Operating Co., Inc., later Clyde Beatty-Cole Bros. Circus. Donaldson sought to intervene
in the proceeding, but intervention was denied. The district court ordered enforcement of
the summons. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, United States v. Mercurio, 418 F.2d 1213, 1969-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9701 (5th Cir. 1969), holding that Donaldson could not intervene because he
had no "proprietary interest" in the materials sought.
59. 400 U.S. at 532, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,764 (quoting Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
440, 449, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9302 at 91,451 (1964)).
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an IRS summons was enforceable if "issued in good faith and prior to a
recommendation for criminal prosecution.""0
The circuits split in their interpretation of Donaldson, some courts stressing the first rule and others following the ultimate holding. 61 The division
among the circuits hinged on whether the issuance of a summons when the
special agent's primary or sole purpose was to unearth criminal evidence
showed a per se lack of good faith,62 or whether the good faith requirement
was met if there was also a valid civil purpose satisfying the Powell criteria
and the summons was issued prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution. 63 Again, because of the hybrid nature of the tax investigation, the answer
actually turned on the good faith of the IRS. To further complicate matters,
circuits adhering to the latter view differed as to when a recommendation for
prosecution occurred -when the special agent recommended criminal prosecution to his immediate superior or when the IRS referred the case to the
Department of Justice. 65 This confusion continued to trouble the courts until
the Supreme Court resolved it in the LaSalle opinion.
Other Improper Purposes. Although the criminal purpose defense is
alleged most often, various other defenses are also available to one contesting
the enforcement of a summons. The Powell Court expressly recognized only
two specific improper purposes, to harass the taxpayer and to pressure him
to settle a collateral dispute. 6 However, by adding "or any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the investigation,"67 the Court left open the
possibility of other improper purposes.
60. 400 U.S. at 556, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 85,765.
61. See cases cited note 51 supra for examples of the split.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 1976-1 U.S. Tax Gas. %9328 (Sd
Cir. 1976); United States v. Zack, 521 F.2d 1366, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9626 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Lafko, 520 F.2d 622, 1965-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9642 (Sd Cir. 1975).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 1978-1 U.S. Tax
Gas. 9235 (2d Gir. 1978); United States v. Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
9184 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Billingsly, 469 F.2d 1208, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9117
(10th Cir. 1972).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Wright Motor Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 1090, 1976-2 US. Tax
Gas. 9605 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Friedman, 552 F.2d 928, 1976-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
9328 (Sd Cir. 1976); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1972-1 U.S. Tax
Gas. 9168 (7th Cir. 1972).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 479 F.2d 1327, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9188 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Artman, 435 F.2d 1576, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9119 (6th Cir. 1970);
In re Magnus, Mabee & Reynard, 511 F.2d 12, 1963-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9114 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 370 U.S. 918 (1962).
Generally, the IRS does not issue a summons after a formal recommendation to the
Justice Department has been made. However, one frequently cited case in which this did
occur was United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 1953-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9591 (D. Mass.
1953). The taxpayer had already been indicted, and the special agent had completed his
investigation and report. The Department of Justice had indirectly "suggested" that the
summons be issued by the special agent to aid the Government in preparing the pending
criminal case. The special agent admitted that at least one purpose of the summons was
to aid the Justice Department. The O'Connor court refused to enforce the summons. Id.
66. 379 U.S. at 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 94,255.
67. Id. Although this seems to leave the door open to other types of improper purpose,
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Governmental harassment has been alleged frequently" and probably will
appear even more often now that the criminal purpose doctrine has been so
severely narrowed by the recent LaSalle decision. The mere allegation that
the IRS has no proper purpose would itself reflect upon the government's
good faith and would, therefore, be a valid defense to enforcement. Indeed,
a number of parties have alleged that the material sought is irrelevant, cumulative, or already in the possession of the Commissioner.- Some commentators
have suggested that in specific instances involving summons issuance, the
IRS was engaging in a "fishing expedition." "Fishing expeditions" have
generally been held to be improper7 although they have been found to be
a proper use of the summons where the IRS had a valid reason to suspect unpaid taxes. 71 The courts generally use a case-by-case approach, enforcing the
taxpayers continue to use the ones specified plus criminal purpose, probably because most
any other purpose would be encompassed by these broad categories.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9266
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (see text accompanying notes 143-147 infra); United States v. Church of
Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 1975-2 US. Tax Cas. 9584 (9th Cir. 1975) (see text accompanying
notes 131-134 infra); United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9217
(7th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer who was in custody under sentence for other conviction alleged
harassment as well as sole criminal purpose and pressure to settle a collateral dispute).
69. In United States v. Coopers & Lybrand, 550 F.2d 615, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9216
(10th Cir. 1977), the Court affirmed the lower court's finding that the information requested
by the summons - the firm's audit program and tax pool analysis - were not relevant to
the investigation. Therefore, the summons did not meet this element of the Powell criteria
and was unenforceable.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 518 F.2d 747, 1975-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9705 (5th Cir. 1975). See note 71 infra.
71. This characterization has been applied to the "John Doe" summons where the IRS
issues a third party summons to obtain information which might disclose tax liability or
fraud but where the IRS does not know the name of the taxpayer. A well known example
is United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 1976-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9247 (1975) in which a
Kentucky bank received deposits containing four hundred decrepit $100 bills. The IRS issued
the summons to Mr. Bisceglia, an officer of the bank, to obtain records in order to identify
the depositor to ascertain whether an unpaid tax liability might exist. The Court enforced
the summons concluding that since IRS agents are authorized to "proceed from time to time
through each Internal Revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein
who may be liable to pay any Internal Revenue tax," I.R.C. §7601, the Service may summon
records without identifying the unknown taxpayer. Id. at 149-50, 1975-1 US. Tax Cas.
at 86,458. But see, United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 448 F.2d 953, 1974-1 U.S.
Tax Gas. 9186, (5th Cir. 1974), vacated 421 U.S. 943, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9426, aff'd,
518 F.2d 747, 1975-1, U.S. Tax Gas. 9705 (5th Cir. 1975), in which the Fifth Circuit, reconsidering the case in accordance with a Supreme Court order for reconsideration in light
of Bisceglia, continued to deny enforcement of a summons seeking the identities of lessors
of mineral rights to which expired leases had been returned without the oil company having
extracted any minerals. The purpose of this information was to determine whether the
lessors had restored in their tax returns the depletion allowance which they had claimed
during the life of the lease. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Bisceglia because the IRS had
a valid reason to suspect unpaid taxes in Bisceglia and no such ground in Humble Oil,
518 F.2d at 747, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 88,144; see generally Mastry, .Bisceglia & Humble
Oil: A New Era in Internal Revenue Service Summonses, 50 FLA. B.J. 311 (1976).
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 added a new section effective February 28, 1977, regarding
the John Doe Summons. It requires that the summons relate to the investigation of a
particular party or ascertainable group or class of persons, that the IRS have a reasonable
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summons when sufficiently related to specific tax liability but not when the
72
purpose is general research.
United States v. LaSalle NationalBank
The 1978 Supreme Court opinion in United States v. LaSalle National
Bank73 effectuated the almost complete demise of the criminal purpose doctrine.
Without directly challenging the premise that the summons may not be used
solely to collect evidence for criminal prosecution, the LaSalle majority so
severely narrowed the doctrine that only a shell remains. The Court stressed
the dual civil and criminal nature of an Internal Revenue investigation and
indicated that it must be reflected in any limitation on the good faith use of
the summons.7 4 The Court concluded that a summons, even if issued primarily
to investigate criminal liability, is valid as long as a civil purpose is also
75

present.

As to the question of when the summons would be improper, the Court
decided that after referral of the case to the Department of Justice, the
summons could no longer be enforced.7 6 The majority reasoned that although
a civil purpose might conceivably continue to exist even after referral, prohibition was necessary as a "prophylactic restraint."7 7 In effect, the majority
basis for believing tax liability is involved, and that the information sought is not readily
available from other sources. I.R.C. §7609(f).
72. See Note, IRS Access to Bank Records; Proposed Modifications in Administrative
Subpoena Procedure, 28 HATNGs L.J. 247, 278 (1976).
73. 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978). The Court called this opinion a
"supplement" to their Donaldson opinion (discussed in text accompanying notes 58-60 supra).
Id. at 2359, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,576.
In LaSalle, the majority reversed the Seventh Circuit decision, concluding that the lower
court bad misinterpreted Donaldson. Id. at 2365 n.15, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582 n.15.
The Seventh Circuit had affirmed the district court's finding that the summons was unenforceable because the special agent was subjectively pursuing a "purely criminal" investigation. 554 F.2d 302, 1977-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9344 (5th Cir. 1977).
Although the agent testified that he was also pursuing a civil aspect, the district court
apparently did not believe him, stating that "it had heard nothing in Agent Oliver's testimony to suggest that the thought of a civil investigation ever crossed his mind." Id. at 303,
1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,775.
Additionally, the special agent who was investigating the taxpayer, John Gattuso, was
doing so without the customary assistance of a revenue agent from the audit division. When
asked about this he indicated that there was no revenue agent "because the investigation
was for criminal violations." The agent had requested the assignment "to investigate the
possibility of any criminal violations.. ." because of information he had received from a
confidential informant and from an unrelated investigation. As a result of this unrelated
investigation, the special agent had received information from the F.B.I. 98 S. Ct. at 2359,
1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,576.
74. 98 S. Ct. at 2363-65, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,580-82. "In short, Congress has not
categorized tax fraud investigations into civil and criminal components. Any limitation on
the good faith use of an Internal Revenue summons must reflect this statutory premise." Id.
at 2365, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582.
75. Id. at 2367, 1978 US. Tax Cas. at 84,584.
76. Id. at 2365, 1978 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582.
77. Id. The Court noted that even this recommendation to the Justice Department,
the civil and criminal elements do not diverge completely and the interest of the IRS in
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vested virtually unlimited summons power in the IRS prior to the actual referral to the Justice Department.
More significantly, the LaSalle majority elucidated that the existence of a
sole criminal purpose is not dependent upon the special agent's personal intent
but instead must be determined by examining the Service's institutional
5
The Court pointed out that while the special agent's sole interest
intent.7
might be to investigate criminal liability, the IRS has an institutional responsibility to collect taxes and impose civil penalties. 79 Furthermore, the
Service may at any time terminate the criminal investigation altogether and
impose civil penalties.80 The four dissenters8l warned that determinations of
the "institutional good faith" of the Internal Revenue Service would prove
to be elusive, burdensome, and unworkable, producing "little but endless discovery proceedings and ultimate frustration of the fair administration of the
Internal Revenue Code."

' 2

Although the LaSalle Court dealt a heavy blow to the taxpayer's chances
of proving sole criminal purpose,83 the majority refused to abandon completely this aspect of the good faith duty of the IRS. 4 The Court noted
that sole criminal purpose still might preclude a finding of good faith if
the IRS unnecessarily delayed referral to the Justice Department in order to
unearth additional evidence for the subsequent criminal prosecution of the
taxpayer.8 5 Therefore, the Court left open a small loophole for the taxpayer
unpaid taxes does not stop. However, the majority felt that at the point of referral, both
the likelihood of broadening criminal discovery and of infringing upon the role of the
grand jury would increase. Id.
78. Id. at 2866, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,583.
79. The findings of the special agent are reviewed by his immediate supervisor, the
district chief of the Intelligence Division, and the Office of Regional Counsel. Id. (citing
26 C.F.R. §601.107(c) (1977)); Internal Revenue Service Organization and Functions §1116(3),
39 Fed. Reg. 10602 (1974); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9600, J9624, 961.2, 9631.4 (1977).
The case may then be reviewed at a national level, and at various points during these
reviews the taxpayer may request a conference with Intelligence officials. Id. As an additional protection, the taxpayer may obtain a conference upon request or whenever the
Division Chief determines a conference to be in the Government's best interest (citing 26
C.F.R. §601.107(b)(2) (1977); Internal Revenue Manual, ch. 9300, 9356.1 (1977)). Id. at
2367, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,583.
80. Id. The IRS can impose a civil penalty of 50% of the underpayment. I.R.C. §6653(b).
This is considered a part of the taxpayer's liability. I.R.C. §6659(a).
81. The Court split five to four; the dissent was written by Justice Stewart and joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens.
82. 98 S. Ct. at 2369, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,585 (Stewart, J. dissenting). The
dissent would have gone even further than the majority by enforcing all summonses issued
before recommendation to the Justice Department even if there was no civil purpose. The
dissent finds no statutory limitation to civil liability. Id.
83. The LaSalle Court reiterated that the taxpayer bears the burden of proving lack
of valid civil purpose by the IRS (see text accompanying note 44 supra). The majority
acknowledged that the burden is a heavy one. 98 S. Ct. at 2367, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at
84,584.
84. Id. The majority notes that the dissent would completely eliminate this aspect
of the good faith inquiry and suggests that the dissent's error is a fundamental misunderstanding of the authority of the IRS. Id. at 2367 n.18, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,584 n.18.
85. Id. at 2367-68, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,584. This hypothetical situation seems
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who apparently would need to show that the IRS has concluded the civil
liability investigation and is merely delaying referral to collect further in-

criminating evidence.
In summation, the Court set out updated requirements for enforcement
of the summons: (1) the summons must be issued before the IRS recommends
criminal prosecution to the Justice Department, (2) the Service must at all
times use the summons authority in good faith pursuant to a congressionally
authorized purpose, thus meeting the Powell criteria, and (3) the Service must
not abandon the pursuit of a civil tax determination or collection in an
institutional sense.88
INTERVENTnON

When the IRS summons is issued to a taxpayer under investigation, he
may challenge its enforcement by appearing but refusing to comply, thus
forcing the IRS to file a petition in the federal district court for judicial en-

forcement. In court, the taxpayer may attempt to show that the IRS has no
proper purpose for issuance. 7 Frequently, however, the summons is not issued
to be somewhat analogous to the delay by the revenue agent in referring the case to a
special agent involved in United States v. Toussaint, No. H-78-86 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 14,
1978), discussed note 50 supra.
86. Id. at 2368, 1978-2 US. Tax Gas. at 84,584. The Court notes that these requirements
are not intended to be exclusive and that future cases "may well reveal the need to prevent
other forms of agency abuse of congressional authority and judicial process." Id. at 2368
n.20, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,584 n.20.
87. A taxpayer who has received a summons relating to his own tax liability can
challenge enforcement on grounds which are not available to a third party. Fourth and
fifth amendment rights have been the subject of much debate in the courts and by
numerous commentators. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 US. 435, 1976-1 US. Tax
Gas. 9380 (1976) (fourth amendment does not prohibit obtaining information revealed to
third party such as bank and conveyed to governmental agency such as IRS); Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 1976-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9353 (1976) (requiring taxpayer's
attorney to produce documents does not violate taxpayer's Effth amendment right against
self-incrimination because taxpayer is not compelled to produce such records himself);
Couch v. United States, 409 US. 322, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9159 (1973) (fifth amendment
rights do not adhere to records belonging to accountant even when accountant has turned
over records to taxpayer's attorney); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 1973-1 US.
Tax Gas. 9477 (4th Cir. 1973) (fourth- amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures does not require that administrative summonses meet a "probable
cause" standard); United States v. Held, 435 F.2d 1361, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9329 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1970) (taxpayer's fifth amendment privilege not violated
where summons required taxpayer to appear and answer all questions relevant to inquiry
to which he raised no valid claim of self-incrimination); McGarry's Inc. v. Rose, -44 F.2d
416, 1965-1 US. Tax Gas. 9391 (1st Cir. 1965) (government can summon information previously obtained in an illegal search and seizure and returned to taxpayer, if it had
knowledge of existence of the information independent of the illegal search and seizure);
Comment, Constitutional Law -Taxpayer's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-Fisher v. United States, 18 B.C. IuNus. & CoM. L. Rav. 998 (1977).
As shown by the above cases, fourth and fifth amendment privileges have been severely
narrowed. The taxpayer's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applies only
when the records actually belong to him (see, e.g., United States v. Widelski, 452 F.2d 1,
1972-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9154 (1971)) and may be lost by turning the records over to a
third party as shown by Couch and Fisher.
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to the taxpayer but to a third party such as the taxpayer's accountant, attorney,
bank, employer, or a credit agency or corporation. The third party usually
has no interest in challenging enforcement of the summons and would
voluntarily comply without the taxpayer's objection.88 The taxpayer under
investigation may have a substantial interest in challenging enforcement, in
which case he may request that the summoned party refuse compliance, 9 thus
forcing the Service to litigate. The taxpayer must then file a motion to intervene in the enforcement proceeding.90 The intervention issue has produced
much disagreement among the circuits. 91 In response, the Supreme Court held
in Donaldson-2 that the taxpayer could not intervene unless he had a proprie93
tary interest in the books or records summoned.
Recently enacted section 7609 of the Internal Revenue Code94 gives the
taxpayer a statutory right to intervene in the enforcement proceedings for
the sole reason that his tax liability is under investigation. Section 7609(a)(1)
requires that the IRS give notice 95 to the taxpayer whose liability is involved
Furthermore, partnership records are not protected by the fifth amendment. United
States v. Greenleaf, 546 F.2d 123, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9168 (sth Cir. 1977) (a partnership has no fifth amendment rights). A corporation also has no fifth amendment rights.
Essgee of China v. United States, 262 US. 151 (1923); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
Even when the taxpayer is the sole owner of the corporation, he cannot assert his
personal privilege against self-incrimination as a defense to production of corporate records.
United States v. Bell, 448 F.2d 40, 1971-2 US. Tax Cas. 9649 (9th Cir. 1971).
88. See, e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 US. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173 (1971).
89. The third party summonee may notify the taxpayer when he receives a summons.
However, this is not required and the summonee could comply without the taxpayer ever
knowing.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
91. According to Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449, 1964-1 US. Tax Cas. 9302 at
91,451 (1964), third parties may intervene to protect their interests, if the taxpayer is
not a party, he too may intervene (citing Corbin Deposit Bank v. United States, 244 F.2d
177, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 19673 (6th Cir. 1957) and !In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial
Hosp., 209 F.2d 122, 1954-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 49,013 (2d Cir. 1953)).
Unfortunately, Reisman did not define the "interests" which the taxpayer must assert
to enable his intervention. Some courts interpreted these interests very broadly; see, e.g.,
United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9217 (7th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer may intervene as a matter of right when his tax liability is the subject of the investigation); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 1969-1 US. Tax Gas. 9156
(3d Cir. 1969) (taxpayer intervention upheld because he alleged that summons was issued
based upon information acquired in illegal search); Justice v. United States, 365 F.2d 312,
1966-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9609 (6th Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 199 (1968) (taxpayer intervention
permitted to raise constitutional objections).
Other courts held that the taxpayer must assert a proprietary interest in the summoned
records. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43, 1966-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9529 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966); In re Cole, 342 F.2d 5, 1965-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9271 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
92. 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173 (1971).
93. Id. at 531, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,763-64.
94. I.R.C. §7609 was enacted as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, tit. XII, §1205, 90 Stat. 1699, and became effective Feb. 28, 1977.
95. I.R.C. §7609(a): "NOTICE-() IN GENERAL-IF-(A) any summons described
in subsection (c) is served on any person who is a third party recordkeeper, and (b) the
summons requires the production of any portion of records made or kept of the business
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96
when a summons is issued to a "third party recordkeeper," the Code definition of which enumerates specific parties and institutions that would
normally keep records of a taxpayer's financial transactions. The taxpayer
may then instruct the summoned third party recordkeeper not to comply
pending enforcement proceedings9 7 Any taxpayer who has the right to nod8
fication has a further statutory right to intervene in the proceedings

transactions or affairs of any person (other than the person summoned) who is identified
in the description of the records contained in the summons, then notice of the summons
shall be given to any person so identified within 3 days of the day on which such service
is made, but no later than the 14th day before the day fixed in the summons as the
day upon which such records are to be examined. Such notice shall be accompanied by a
copy of the summons which has been served and shall contain directions for staying com"
pliance with the summons under subsection (b)(2) ..
96. A third party recordkeeper is defined in I.R.C. §7609(a)(3), for the purposes of that
subsection, as: "(A) any mutual savings bank, cooperative bank, domestic building and loan
association, or other savings institution chartered and supervised as a savings and loan or

similar association under Federal or State law, any bank (as defined in section 581), or any
credit union (within the meaning of section 501(c)(14)(A)); (B) any consumer reporting
agency (as defined under section 603(d) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681a(f)));
(C) any person extending credit through the use of credit cards or similar devices; (D)any
broker (as defined in section 5(a)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c(a)(4))); (E) any attorney; and (F) any accountant."
any
97. I.R.C. §7609(b)(2): "RIGHT TO STAY COMPLIANCE -Notwithstanding
other law or rule of law, any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) [see note 95 supra] shall have the right to stay compliance with the summons....
Such notice must be given to the summonee in writing within 14 days. Id.
In a recent decision, United States v. Bank of Monte Vista, No. 78-W-458 (D. Colo.
June 15, 1978), Chief Judge Winner expressed his concerns regarding problems arising
under the new provisions. In the case at bar, he noted the Bank of Monte Vista "got
hauled into court because they have obeyed the law." Id. He continued that, even worse,
the government had tendered an order requiring them to appear in person because the
most inconvenient method of meeting the statute was the most convenient for the IRS. Id.
The taxpayer involved had requested the bank not to comply, per I.R.C. §1609(b)(2)(a)
and accordingly, the bank refused to comply; in fact, did not show up at the appointed
place at all. The place where the bank officer was to appear was in Pueblo which was
280 miles round trip from Monte Vista when there was an IRS office only 17 miles away.
The judge also suggested that the IRS agent could have gone to the bank.
The judge continued that he and the other Colorado judges would refuse to "knuckle
under" to the procedures advocated by the IRS and United States attorney. Accordingly,
he refused to sign the show cause order or to order the bank official to "show up" in Pueblo.
Instead, he insisted on an order that merely required the bank to notify the court within
twenty days if it were going to refuse to comply per request of the taxpayer. Id.
As noted in United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 86, 38 n.2, 1978-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. %9235 at 83,424 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978), the quid pro quo for the right granted in
I.R.C. §7609(b) is I.R.C. §7609(e), which provides: "Suspension of statute of limitations.If any person takes any action as provided in subsection (b) and such person is the person
with respect to whose liability the summons is issued (or is the agent, nominee, or other
person acting under the direction or control of such person), then the running of any
period of limitations under section 6501 (relating to the assessment and collection of tax)
or under section 65K1 (relating to criminal prosecutions) with respect to such person shall
be suspended for the period during which a proceeding, and appeals therein, with respect
to the enforcement of such summons is pending."
98. I.R.C. §7609(b)(1) provides: "INTERVENTION -Notwithstanding any other law
or rule of law, any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a)
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By providing more effective due process rights to the taxpayer, section
7609 makes the Powell mandated adversary hearing9 9 somewhat less illusory. 0°
Although section 7609(b)(1) might appear to give automatic intervention
rights to all taxpayers, intervention has been denied when the third party
falls outside of the definition of a third party recordkeeper.1° 1 For example,
if the taxpayer under investigation is a corporate officer or director, the
IRS might summon corporate records which do not record the taxpayer's
personal financial transactions, but may still bear upon his tax liability. In
this case the corporation is not a third party recordkeeper under the Code
definition. 102 It seems questionable as to whether Congress intended to make
this distinction among summoned third parties. 10 3 Nonetheless, because this
distinction sometimes precludes intervention as of right, further litigation will
undoubtedly ensue when the summonee is not a "third party recordkeeper."
At any rate, the right to intervene is now recognized for most taxpayers who
will fall within the provisions of section 7609(b)(1).104
shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding with respect to the enforcement of
such summons under section 7604."
It might be noted that a taxpayer must make a timely application to intervene or
waive his right to do so. In United States v. Portage Nat'l Bank, No. C78-567 (N.D. Ohio
June 13, 1978), the taxpayer waited 26 days before attempting to intervene. The judge
stated that adopting either I.R.C. §7609(b)(2), affording taxpayer 14 days to stay the examination, or Fa. R. Civ. P. 12(a) which allows 20 days to respond to a summons, taxpayer failed
to pursue his right to intervene in a timely manner and therefore, waived it.
99. This is sometimes referred to as the Reisman-Powell mandated adversary hearing.
Both Reisman and Powell were decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1964.
Reisman stated that "[a]ny enforcement action under this section would be an adversary
." 375
proceeding affording a judicial determination of the challenges to the summons..
U.S. at 446, 194-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 91,450. Powell, which followed Reisman in sequence,
stated that its holding requiring the IRS to meet the four criteria for proper purpose (see
text accompanying note 42 supra) in lieu of showing probable cause "does not make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is
ordered" (footnote omitted). 379 U.S. at 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,233.
100. Obviously, it is quite difficult for a taxpayer to contest enforcement of a summons
when he cannot intervene; he can hardly expect the third party summonee to challenge
it for him. The idea of an "adversary" hearing with no one contesting the enforcement
of the summons seems incongruous, thus rendering the adversariness of the hearing illusary.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Gartland, Inc., No. Y-78-747 (D. Md. July 7, 1978). See
note 102 infra.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Gartland, Inc., No. Y-78-747 (D. Md. July 7, 1978). In
Gartland, the court did not allow the taxpayer to intervene where the summons required a
corporation to produce all records pertaining to transactions with taxpayer. The court
reasoned that because the records sought pertained to the corporation's own transactions,
the corporation was not a third party recordkeeper to the taxpayer. For definition of third
party recordkeeper, see note 96 supra. The court continued that taxpayer could not intervene under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because he had no proprietary interest in
the records (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9173
(1971)). See text accompanying note 93 supra.
103. It seems more logical that Congress intended that all taxpayers under investigation
be given the right to intervene since a third party's records which reflect upon the taxpayer's liability may be used by the IRS for the same purpose as records of the taxpayer's
own transactions. See generally H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] 4 U.S.
CODE CONe. &: AD. NEws 3202-06.
104. See note 98 supra.
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DiscovERY AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE SUMMONS ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDINGS

To prove allegations of improper purpose, or lack of proper purpose, a
party may need to use the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 0 5 Although the federal discovery rules became effective in 1938
and were first held to be applicable to enforcement proceedings in 1942,1-0
the recent interest in their use seems to have been triggered by a Powell footnote which restated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable
to the summons enforcement proceeding. 10 7 Unfortunately, Powell presented
no standards for determining when discovery should be permitted or the
extent to which it should be allowed. After Powell, courts attempted to apply
the federal rules in a way that would allow the taxpayer sufficient discovery
to comply with due process without unnecessarily restricting the IRS in the
performance of its duties. Rule 81(a)(3) 0 " authorizes the application of Rule
26 to enforcement proceedings. In providing for discovery, Rule 26109 gives
the court discretion to deny discovery or limit its scope for adequate cause.
Accordingly, the appellate courts have generally allowed the trial court judge
0
wide discretion regarding the granting and limiting of discovery." Virtually
105. See FED. R. COv. P. 81(a)(3) & 26. See notes 108-109 infra and accompanying text.
106. See Martin v. Chandis Sec. Co., 128 F.2d 781, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas. §9521 (9th Cir.
1942); Comment, PretrialDiscovery of Internal Revenue Service Investigative Files, 6 SUFFOLK
L. REV.230, 232 n.23 (1972).
107. Comment, supra note 106. For the Powell footnote referred to in text, see 879
U.S. at 58, 59 n.18, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 94,233 n.18.
Another explanation for the recent interest in discovery might be Powell's reiteration
of the Reisman dicta stating that the taxpayer could challenge the enforcement "on any
appropriate ground." United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 58, 1964-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 94,233
(citing Reisman v. Caplin, 879 U.S. at 449, 1964-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 91,451).
108. FEn. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) states in part: "These rules apply to proceedings to compel
the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena issued
by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States except
as otherwise provided by statute or by rules of the district court or by order of the court
in the proceedings."
109. FED. R. Crv. P. 26 provides: "(a) Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery
by one or more of the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to
enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental
examination; and requests for admission. Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision
(c) of this rule, the frequency of use of these methods is not limited...
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery
is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to the deposition, the court in the district where the deposition
is to be taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one
or more of the following: (i) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be
had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time and place;
(8) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by

the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope
of the discovery be limited to certain matters ......
110. See Note, Criminal Tax Fraud Investigations: Limitations on the Scope of the
Section 7602 Summons, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 114, 117 (1972).
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every circuit has recognized at least some limited right to discovery, although
the method and scope permitted has varied greatly.11'
Deposition
In United States v. Roundtree" 2 the taxpayer alleged that the summons
was issued solely for the purposes of gathering evidence for criminal prosecution and harassing the taxpayer. The Fifth Circuit recognized the taxpayer's
right to limited pre-hearing discovery, permitting him to depose the special
agent to determine the purpose of the challenged summons." 3 The court
reasoned that the Powell-mandated adversary hearing required that Roundtree be permitted to investigate the government's purpose "where such purpose
had been put in issue and may effect the legality of the summons." "1 4 The
majority cautioned, however, that if conducted unreasonably, the depositions
could be curtailed by the district court. 15
More recently, in United States v. Wright Motor Co., Inc.,1 6 the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Government's petition
because the special agent refused to answer the taxpayer's questions on deposition. 11 7 Because Donaldson required issuance of the summons in good faith
111. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 1971-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9235 (2d Cir. 1978) (taxpayer must make a substantial preliminary showing before
even limited discovery is ordered); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. %9733 (5th Cir. 1969) (permitted taxpayer to depose special agent to determine
IRS purposes); United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19217 (7th
Cir. 1969) (respondent allowed pre-trial discovery although court could bar or limit scope
and time for taking depositions); United States v. Ahmanson, 415 F.2d 785, 1969-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. 9572 (9th Cir. 1969) (allowed broad discovery which lasted over two years).
112. 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9733 (5th Cir. 1969).
113. Id. at 852, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Gas. at 86,068. The majority affirmed the district
court's denial of Roundtree's requests for interrogatories and his request to inspect the
IRS's files relevant to himself and to his wife, ruling that the requests were irrelevant and
overbroad. Id. at 847-48, 852, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,065, 86,068.
114. Id. at 852, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,068 (footnote omitted).
115. Id. Such curtailment is authorized by FED. R. Cdv. P. 30(d): "Motion to Terminate
or Limit Examination. At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of a
party or of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in
bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass or oppress the deponent
or party, the court . . . may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the taking of
the deposition .... "
Discovery cannot be used to harass the IRS, cause delay, or to obtained privileged information. United States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9320 (W.D.
Tenn. 1968).
116. '536F.2d 1090, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19605 (5th Cir. 1976).
117. Id. at 1095, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,928. Upon the agent's refusal to answer
certain questions regarding the purpose of the summons (per instructions from the Commission), the court dismissed the case under FED. R. Cxv. P. 37(b)(2) which states, in part:
"If a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery . . . the court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matter regarding which the order was made or any other
designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
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and before recommendation for criminal prosecution, the court reasoned that
the taxpayer must be afforded some opportunity to prove his allegations. 118
Deposition is the method of discovery most often granted in the summons
enforcement proceeding." 9 A deposition is not unduly time consuming and can
effectively reveal the special agent's true motives for requesting the summoned
material or testimony. Pursuant to the LaSalle enforcement requirements,
however, courts must consider the IRS's institutional motives which undoubtedly are more difficult to ascertain. 20 The special agent may have insufficient information to discern the interests of the entire institution. The
LaSalle Court did recognize that examination of the agent's motives may still
be necessary to evaluate the Powell good faith factors, 12' even though his
personal motive is not dispositive. However, the taxpayer may now need to
depose other IRS officials to identify institutional purpose. 22 Taking a large
number of depositions might become unduly time consuming, thus interfering
with the contemplated expediency of the summary proceeding. 23 Possibly, as
suggested by the dissent, the LaSalle majority has inadvertently complicated
the enforcement procedure, a circumstance which may produce an unmanageable situation.' 24
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated
claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order .. . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party .... "
118. 536 F.2d at 1095, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,928 (citing United States v. Church
of Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9584 (9th Cir. 1975)). The
taxpayer, Mr. Wright, alleged that the summons was issued for the purpose of securing
evidence for use in his criminal prosecution. 536 F.2d at 1092, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at
84,925.
119. Besides Roundtree (see text accompanying notes 112-115 supra) and Wright Motor
Co. (see text accompanying notes 116-118 supra), see, e.g., United States v. Monsey, 429
F.2d 1348, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9578 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d
1192, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9217 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Lomar Discount Ltd.,
1973); United States v. Kessler, 364 F.
61 F.R.D. 420, 1974-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9820 (N.D. Ill.
Supp. 66, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9781 (S.D. Ohio 1973); United States v. Nunnally, 278 F.
Supp. 843, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9320 (W.D. Tenn. 1968); United States v. Moriarty, 278
F. Supp. 187, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19137 (E.D. Wis. 1967); Kennedy v. Rubin, 254 F.
Supp. 190, 1966-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9603 (N.D. Ill.
1966).
120. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'1 Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501
(1978). For discussion of LaSalle, see notes 73-87 supra.
121. Id. at 2367 n.17, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,584 n.17.
122. The LaSalle Court does not suggest this and probably did not intend to imply a
need for numerous depositions resulting in delay. However, it follows from the holding,
which requires a determination of institutional purpose, that this might be necessary to
ascertain this purpose.
123. The court in United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9648 (Ist
Cir. 1970) states that "[b]road discovery can be expected to cause extensive delays and to
jeopardize the integrity and effectiveness of the entire investigation." Id. at 701, 1970-2
U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,644. The court also cites two cases in which discovery "dragged on"
for two years or more in which time the defense never -proved satisfactory to the court.
The court notes further that "[n]o case has been cited in which discovery has been used
successfully to prove an 'improper purpose' defense." Id. at 701 n.6, 1970-2 US. Tax Cas.
at 84,644 n.6.
124. See text accompanying note 85 supra. Determining the specific purpose of a single
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An alternative to the deposition is the questioning and cross-examination
of the special agent during the adversary hearing. This procedure is generally
125
However, this altermore expedient, and arguably an adequate substitute.
It is probadeposition.
the
in
native suffers from the same infirmities inherent
tive only of the motives and information within the knowledge of one in12
dividual and therefore is of questionable value after LaSalle. 6 Several circuits
have approved and adopted such a procedure. As proposed by the First Circuit
in United States v. Salter,"27 the procedure would involve a limited evidentiary
hearing including examination of the special agent concerning the purpose
of the summons. If after his testimony and, when necessary, questioning by
the judge himself, the court still had substantial question as to whether an
28
The Third
improper purpose might exist, discovery could then be ordered
129
Circuit recommended a nearly identical four point procedure whereby the
IRS would specifically allege compliance with each of the Powell requirements, the summonee or taxpayer would respond by showing cause why the
order should not be enforced, and at the hearing each party would be prepared to prove its allegations and rebut the opponent's case. Finally, if the
the case on the record,
court then concluded that it could not fairly decide
0
it could order discovery or further proceedings."
individual is a relatively simple matter in comparison with the determination of the
purposes of an entire institution such as the IRS, which is composed of many levels and
divisions. Various individuals within the IRS might differ in their interpretations of the
purpose of the investigation and of the specific summons within the investigation. Ascertaining who within the agency would have the necessary information and the authority
to speak in behalf of the institution might also prove problematic. The taxpayer might
experience difficulty ascertaining the proper individuals to request depositions from and
the trial court judge might experience similar difficulty deciding how many and which
depositions to authorize.
125. A number of cases have held that the trial court's denial of discovery was not
an abuse of discretion when the special agent was present at hearing and subject to direct
and cross-examination. See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Tool & Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59,
1975-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9870 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 1973-2
US. Tax Cas. 9489 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bowman, 435 F.2d 467, 1971-1 US.
Tax Gas. 19121 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Erdner, 422 F.2d 835, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
19256 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Note, supra note 1, at 539.
126. Under LaSalle, the motive of the special agent is not dispositive, 98 S. Ct. at 2366,
1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,583. It follows that the deposition of only that agent would not
be too valuable to the taxpayer.
127. 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19648 (1st Cir. 1970).
128. Id. at 700, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,643. In United States v. National State Bank,
454 F.2d 1249, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9168 (7th Cir. 1972), the Seventh Circuit cited
Salter in denying discovery, noting that the taxpayers "did not avail themselves of the
opportunity to elicit direct testimony, or testimony in cross-examination . . . to give
substance to the allegations in their answer." Id. at 1252, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,690.
129. See United States v. McCarthy, 514 F.2d 368, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9402 (3d Cir.
1975).
130. Id. at 372-73, 1975-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 87,027. The proposal provided that:
I) The Secretary would file a complaint which would specifically allege compliance with
each of the Powell requirements. The affidavit would support these allegations.
2) The summoned party would be served with an order fixing a deadline for responsive pleading with affidavit and any motions and directing the summonee to show
cause why the order should not be enforced.
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In United States v. Church of Scientology of California,13a the Ninth Circuit
endorsed the First and Third Circuits' approach. In that case, the Church

of Scientology challenged the enforcement of an IRS summons by claiming
that the summons was issued to harass the Church, to put pressure on the
Church to settle a collateral dispute over its claimed tax exemptions, and to

eliminate Scientology organizations.1 3 2 The appellate court upheld the lower
court's denial of discovery on the basis that it would impede the summary
procedure.1 3 3 The court did, however, reverse and remand the case for an

evidentiary hearing to give the taxpayer an opportunity to show improper
purpose, thus following the procedure outlined by the First and Third
Circuits. 34
Admittedly, this procedure offers the advantage of expediency 36 and, if
adopted by other circuits, would furnish uniformity in contrast to the present
panoply of discovery approaches.136 Considering the barrage of enforcement
3) At the hearing, the Secretary should be prepared to prove that the summons
complies with Powell and to rebut any proper defenses asserted by the summonee. The
summonee should be prepared to produce any rebuttal evidence of the Government's case
and to assume the burden as to affirmative issues which he might raise to support his
claim that enforcement of the summons would constitute an abuse of the court's process.
4) If the court concluded from the summary proceeding that it could not fairly decide
the case on the record, it would be free to direct further proceedings including discovery.
Id.
131. 520 F.2d 818, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9584 (9th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 820-21, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,732. The Church of Scientology cited
several other cases in which the IRS had investigated other Scientology churches. See, e.g.,
Handeland v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 327, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9586 (9th Cir. 1975);
Church of Scientology of Hawaii v. United States, 485 F.2d 313, 1973-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9659
(9th Cir. 1973); Foundling Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1969-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9538 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1009 (1969).
133. 520 F.2d at 824, 1975-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,735.
134. Id. at 825, 1975-2 US. Tax Cas. at 87,735. In a recent opinion, United States v.
Boone, Nos. C-78-151-G, C-78-152-G (M.D.N.C., filed July 6, 1978), the district court
endorsed this procedure set out by the First and Third Circuits.
In Boone, the IRS sought a protective order against taxpayer's interrogatories, request
for production of government documents and notice to take depositions of numerous officials.
The trial court noted that the case was a "prime example" of how summons enforcement
proceedings could be abused if discovery were permitted as a matter of course. The court
quashed the discovery requests, finding them "largely irrelevant, oppressive, and burdensome" (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)), and ordered that no further discovery be made without
further court order. The court also noted in a footnote that taxpayer's concern that the
summons was being used to obtain evidence for use in a criminal proceeding had been
deflated by the Supreme Court in United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978). Id.
135. The IRS's primary argument against discovery is that it causes extensive delay,
thus handicapping the Service, restricting its effectiveness and thwarting its purpose. United
States v. Salter, 432 F.2d at 701, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,664.
136. The trial courts, perhaps even more than appellate courts, differ as to the scope
of discovery granted the taxpayer, generally making the decision on a case by case basis.
Compare United States v. Kessler, 338 F. Supp. 420, 1972-2 US. Tax Cas. 9661 (S.D. Ohio
1972), rev'd, 474 F.2d 995, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9262 (6th Cir. 1973) (trial court authorized
depositions but before second deposition held, enforced summons; Sixth Circuit reversed,
stating that, in interests of fairness, a court may not change its mind without warning and
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proceedings currently pervading the courts,1 37 a judicial guideline for permitting or denying discovery would seem appropriate. However, expediency
must be balanced against constitutionally protected rights such as the rights
to privacy and due processJ 38 The procedure adopted by the First, Third and
Ninth Circuits may not provide the taxpayer sufficient opportunity to discover
the true motives of the IRS. To meet adversary hearing requirements, the envisioned procedure must enable the taxpayer to obtain enough evidence to be
granted further discovery when his defense is or may be valid. 3 9 Courts frequently deny pre-hearing discovery because it might impede the proceeding's
summary nature.14 However, the hearing is meaningless when one party has
no means of obtaining necessary evidence. 141
Unlike the in-court examination, pre-hearing discovery allows the taxpayer time to evaluate information obtained to further prepare his defense.
The proposed in-court procedure might produce unfair surprise for both
parties resulting in a distorted picture of the actual situation and culminating
in either a denial of further needed discovery or a granting of unnecessary
discovery. 42 Perhaps limited pre-trial discovery combined with the in-court
examination would produce a fairer determination of the issues.
terminate litigation) and United States v. Amonson, 415 F.2d 785, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Gas.
9572 (9th Cir. 1969) (allowed broad discovery lasting over two years) with United States
v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9588 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (discovery denied
because too broad and because unnecessary to afford taxpayers a meaningful hearing) and
United States v. Schoendorf, 307 F. Supp. 1034, 1970-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 19178 (E.D. Wis.
1970) (allowed deposition of special agent but denied further discovery).
Therefore, the taxpayer has no way of knowing what to expect in the way of discovery
during the early stages of pre-hearing preparation.
137. See IRS Summons, supra note 7.
138. Obviously, an expedient hearing is of no value if, due to the rush to resolve the
matter, the hearing loses it adversary nature. It then no longer meets the Reisman-Powell
requirement (see note 99 supra) and thus lacks due process.
139. This would seem to be the ultimate goal of an adversary hearing. See generally
Miller, supra note 2.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust, 572 F.2d 86, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9285 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1972-1 US. Tax
Cas. 9168 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9329 (5th Gir. 1971).
141. Although a taxpayer may sincerely believe that the IRS has a bad faith purpose
for issuing the summons, without evidence he has no hope of successfully contesting enforcement. In many instances, this evidence is not available without discovery, which
renders the taxpayer helpless as far as presenting any defense. Thus, what is intended to
be an "adversary" hearing is, instead, a one-sided and very summary procedure.
142. When the special agent is examined in court without any advance deposition,
neither party knows what to expect. Therefore, spur of the moment responses may produce
a distorted picture. For example, the agent may hesitate to answer questions out of concern
as to what he is at liberty to disclose. This could cause the judge to incorrectly suspect
that the agent is hiding an improper purpose. The agent would probably not be aware of
all of the case law regarding proper and improper purposes and might, therefore, be wary
of saying the wrong thing.
On the other hand, the taxpayer's attorney, who may be surprised by the agent's testimony or who may disbelieve him, may not be able to frame the proper questions to elicit
the hoped for responses. Impulsive questions could render the cross-examination disorganized and confusing and might frustrate the judge, who is trying to get a true picture
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Interrogatories
A recent example of the use of the interrogatory in the enforcement proceeding is United States v. Fensterwald.43 Attorney Bernard Fensterwald, Jr.

represented a defendant who, in the early stages of the Watergate investigation, supplied information which may have embarrassed high ranking executive officers.'" He had also served as Chief Counsel to the Senate Committee
which investigated and produced evidence of alleged illegal activities of the
Internal Revenue Service.145 Fensterwald claimed that the special audit of

his tax return was connected with his former activities and was intended to
harass him. Apparently, the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that
Fensterwald had reason to suspect harassment, holding that he clearly had

"taken himself out of the category of an ordinary taxpayer challenging the
good faith of the Internal Revenue Service in conducting a special audit."'4 6
The court thus determined that the taxpayer should have been permitted
limited discovery to determine how his tax return was selected for special
audit. The case was remanded for discovery, preferably specific interrogatories
47
addressed to IRS officials.'
This was an exceptional case, however, for interrogatories are authorized
far less often than depositions in enforcement proceedings.' s Like a deposition, an interrogatory must be relevant to the hearing's purpose and may not
be used for broad discovery of the Government's case. 49 However, taxpayers
may have preferred the deposition because responses to interrogatories are
often less spontaneous and candid than those on deposition. 150 In addition,

of the situation. The entire situation might merely compound the problem of determining
whether discovery is needed.
143. 553 F.2d 231, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. t9266 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
144. See IRS Summons, supra note 7, at 8329. Attorney Fensterwald represented James
McCord, one of the original seven Watergate conspirators. This was at the time when
McCord revealed information to Judge Siica contributing to judicial, congressional, and
public knowledge of the Watergate conspiracy. Fensterwald also represented James Earl
Ray and other well known persons in controversial cases. 553 F.2d at 232, 1977-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. at 86,555.
145. 553 F.2d at 232, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 8635, Fensterwald noted that the
tax returns of Senator Long of Missouri, Chairman of the Senate Committee, somehow
reached the hands of a national publication and were published, destroying Long's political
career. Id.
146. Id. Harassment by the IRS was also alleged in United States v. Hayes, 408 F.2d
932, 1969-1 U.S. Tax Cas. %9231 (7th Cir. 1969), in which an allegedly non-profit foundation had been the subject of discussion of a House Subcommittee Investigation. Foundation
trustee Hayes was permitted to depose the IRS agent, but the court determined that the
IRS's purpose was to discover abuse of tax-exempt status, which necessitated a determination
of tax liability and was, therefore, proper. 553 F.2d at 232, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,535.
147. 553 F.2d at 232, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,556.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2 US. Tax Cas. %9753 (5th

Cir. 1969).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 560 F.2d 373, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. %9390 (3d
Cir. 1969) (discovery denied because interrogatories too broad and, allegedly, harassed IRS).
See also Duke, supra note 1, at 60.
150. Interrogatories have been requested and granted in some instances. See United
States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp, 843, 1968-1 U,S, Tax Cas. 19320 (W.D. Tenn. 1968). Inter-
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interrogatories take longer to prepare and to answer, thus making courts
more hesitant to authorize them. Nevertheless, the interrogatory could be
useful in determining the institutional purpose of the IRS as mandated by
the LaSalle majority. An interrogatory could produce a substantial amount
of information from a high official with authority to answer for the IRS as
an institution, thus avoiding the necessity of arranging times and places for
depositions. This is a significant advantage when officials are located in more
distant areas of the country. Furthermore, officials might need to inquire
in several divisions of the Service to determine the purpose of the entire
agency, necessarily requiring more time but probably leading to more accurate
information. The interrogatory therefore could be an extremely practical tool
for ascertaining institutional purpose if complete and candid responses were
forthcoming from IRS representatives.
Production of Government Documents
A discovery device which is often requested,' but only occasionally
granted 52 is the production and examination of government documents.
Courts are hesitant to grant this type of discovery absent a strong showing
of necessity. 1' 3 A frequent impediment to gaining access to documents is the
official information privilege,154 which the IRS may claim in order to prevent
rogatories were permitted to determine IRS's purpose in denying tax-exempt status in
Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Schultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19118
(D.D.C. 1973) (see notes 164-174 infra). But see United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845,
1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. J9733 (5th Cir. 1969) (denying motion requesting interrogatories; see
note 113 supra).
Exhaustive discovery is possible with an interrogatory, unlike the deposition where
the official could only provide information available at the time. The pre-hearing deposition may involve some of the same problems as the in court examination. See note 142
supra. However, the taxpayer will have time to evaluate the information to prepare for
further questioning at the hearing. The agent can prepare his own testimony more adequately by becoming aware at disposition of what information he should acquire before
the hearing.
151. See, e.g., United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. %9266
(D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9733 (5th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373, 1966-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9390 (3d Cir.
1966).
152. See United States v. Interstate Tool & Eng'r Corp., 526 F.2d 59, 1975-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9870 (7th Cir. 1975) (granted inspection of some documents); United States v.
Monsey, 429 F.2d 1348, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9578 (7th Cir. 1970) (district court granted
such discovery but issue became moot before appeal); United States v. Duke, 379 F. Supp.
545, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9475 (N.D. I1. 1974) (in camera inspection granted). Two
other cases which did not involve the summons, but in which discovery of IRS documents
was granted, are Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415, 1976-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9558 (D.D.C. 1976) (public interest group concerned with tax reform gained access
to documents, the existence of which was revealed by testimony of John Dean before
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, under the Freedom of Information Act) and Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863,
1974-1 US. Tax Gas. 9118 (D.D.C. 1973) (see notes 164-174 infra and accompanying text).
153. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
154. Although there are some statutory governmental privileges and such governmental privileges as state secret, military, or informers' privilege, there is also a non-
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disclosure of memoranda, writings and official documents. In considering
whether this privilege exists, the court must balance the government's interest
in protecting the policy-making process of the IRS against the taxpayer's need
for the documents to prove his allegations. 155 The IRS insists that its policymaking process depends upon a free exchange of participants' views, which
is not feasible without protection of its records. 5 6
An apparent trend toward increased disclosure of documents is evidenced
by the passage of and the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA)3.'5 Although this act has been used successfully to obtain disclosure of IRS documents and publications, 58 courts have generally held that
the FOIA is not intended to accelerate or circumvent normal discovery procedures in pending investigations. 59 One could argue, however, that if documents would be available under the FOIA, denial of access to the identical information for discovery would be senseless. 60
statutory official information privilege which protects suggestions, advice, recommendations
and opinions, but not factual and investigatory reports, data, and surveys. United States v.
Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658 nn.3 & 4 (6th Cir. 1976) (antitrust action in which
government asserted official information privilege to prevent discovery). See also Note,
Discovery of Government Documents and the Official Information Privilege, 76 CoLum. L.

Rav. 142 (1976).
155. Cf. United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 1976) (in
antitrust action, court "properly applied a balancing test in determining whether LP
[Leggett & Platt] could pierce the qualified governmental official information privilege."
[footnote omitted]. See also, Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415, 423,
1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9558 at 84,773 (D.D.C. 1976); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 945-46 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (discussing purpose of privileges).
In Tax Reform Research Group the court discussed the possibility of the invasion of
that personal privacy of a taxpayer which has traditionally been protected by the IRS.
419 F. Supp. at 418, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,770. In the summons enforcement proceedings, however, the taxpayer presumably would waive this privilege, because it is to his
advantage to have IRS records of his tax transactions produced in court.
156. See Rosenbloom, More IRS Information May Become Public Due to Amended
Freedom of Information Act, 45 J. TAX. 258, 261 (1976).

157. 5 US.C. §552 (1977). See generally Rosenbloom, supra note 156; Note, The Federal
"Government in the Sunshine Act": A Public Access Compromise, 29 U. FL.A. L. Ray.

881 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419 F. Supp. 415, 1976-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. 19558 (D.D.C. 1976). FOIA litigation has also resulted in the publication of most of
the IRS manual. Rosenbloom, sitpra note 156, at 258. A letter from the IRS Commissioner
to Senator Edward M. Kennedy included a list of 44 cases which had been initiated
against the IRS under FOIA as of October 21, 1975. Id. at 262.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19,289
(5th Cir. 1977) (where tax protestor convicted for willful failure to file income tax returns
alleged discriminatory prosecution under FOIA, court held that FOIA and Privacy Act
of 1974 did not enlarge scope of discovery available to defendant under FED. R. CRri. P. 16);
Williams v. IRS, 345 F. Supp. 591, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9406 (D. Del. 1972), aff'd, 479
F.2d 317, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9476 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1024 (1973) (work
papers and data prepared or used by agent in the tax investigation of plaintiff exempt
from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)).
160. Rosenbloom, supra note 156, at 262. The counterpart to this argument is that
the FOIA anticipates special administrative proceedings prior to litigation, and this process
should not be circumvented. Id.
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Another recent phenomenon symptomatic of the trend toward increased
disclosure is the unique situation presented by the allegations of White House
influence on IRS policy and practice. The resulting revelations and implications triggered more liberal access to traditionally protected government
documents. 16' Admittedly, the strong public interest in a thorough airing of
these serious abuses called for much broader discovery than that necessary for
the average taxpayer challenging summons enforcement. 1 2 Nevertheless, this
trend toward governmental disclosure could make the production and examination of government documents a more viable discovery method.
Even when disclosure of documents is ordered, the IRS may not be
entirely cooperative in complying.- 3 Although the IRS has not faced a broad
discovery order involving the production of documents in a summons enforcement proceeding, its lack of cooperation is illustrated by Center on Corporate
Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz.164 Plaintiff, a charitable and educational organization, 165 requested tax-exempt status.16 Although the IRS indicated to
plaintiff that it would qualify, an adverse ruling was ultimately issued.6 7
Plaintiff alleged that the ruling was a direct result of political influence on
the Service. 168 Pursuant to a letter sent to the court by plaintiff's counsel citing
various indicia of White House influence, the court granted the plaintiff dis161. See, e.g., Center on Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863,
1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9118 (D.D.C. 1973) (see text accompanying notes 164-174 infra).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Fensterwald, 653 F.2d 231, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9266
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (see text accompanying notes 143-147 supra); Teague v. Alexander, 1978-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 9363 (D. Colo. 1978) (Indochina Solidarity Committee alleged harassment
by Activist Organizations Committee of IRS). Cf. Tax Reform Research Group v. IRS, 419
F. Supp. 415, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9558 (D.D.C. 1976) (public interest group requesting
IRS documents under FOIA for purposes of tax reform).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9648 (1st Cir.
1970) (respondent granted discovery of IRS documents by trial court but IRS refused to
comply; trial court dismissed government's action but the First Circuit reversed); United
States v. Duke, 379 F. Supp. 545, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9475 (N.D. IIl. 1974) (although
government refused to submit to pre-trial discovery, it did produce its file later for
in camera inspection); Center of Corporate Responsibility, Inc. v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp.
863, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9118 (D.D.C. 1973) (see notes 164-174 infra and accompanying
text); United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9781 (S.D. Ohio 1973)
(government refused to comply with court order to produce work papers in camera).
164. 368 F. Supp. 863, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9118 (D.D.C. 1973).
165. The purpose of plaintiff organization, incorporated under the laws of the District
of Columbia, was to: "engage in and conduct educational and charitable activities on a
non-profit basis to improve and better the conditions of American life and institutions by
promoting the development of increased responsibility and awareness on the part of
corporate entities and decision-makers to use the corporate institution and power to better
the social welfare, particularly in the areas of minority group problems and employment discrimination, pollution, and utilization and conservation of national resources- economic,
human, natural and otherwise." Id. at 866, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,047.
166. To qualify for tax exempt status, the plaintiff ceased participation in proxy contest
activities upon the advice of the IRS. Id.
167. The adverse ruling was issued by the IRS only after plaintiff brought suit in
federal district court to enjoin defendants from refusing to rule on plaintiff's tax exempt
status. Id. at 867, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,048.
168. Id. at 866, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,047.
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covery, including depositions, interrogatories, the production of unprivileged
IRS documents and files, and all relevant documents, memoranda and other

writings in the possession of the White House. 169 Although plaintiff accomplished sufficient discovery to indicate such influence, 170 the IRS did not cooperate fully, thus hindering discovery.' 71 Citing the Government's delaying
tactics and refusal to comply adequately with discovery orders, the court
eventually imposed the Rule 37(b)(2) sanction 72 pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the plaintiff's allegations were considered
to be established, 73 and the adverse ruling regarding its tax-exempt status
was nullified. 17 4
169. Id. at 867, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,048.
170. Plaintiff was permitted inspection of the IRS file concerning its application, at

which time plaintiff discovered handwritten notes by the Assistant Director of the Interpretation Division with the notation "perhaps White House pressure." Id. at 867-68, 1974-1
U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,048-49. Apparently plaintiff's application had been channeled through
the Interpretive Division of the Chief Counsel's Office because the IRS's primary concern
with the plaintiff's proxy contest activities was a novel question. Subsequent to this objection, the plaintiff agreed to cease these activities. Id.
171. Depositions revealed inadequate compliance with discovery orders, including testimony that the search of White House files was limited and inadequate. The search, by
someone unfamiliar with the files, failed to produce certain relevant documents and
writings specifically referred to by John Dean and Patrick J. Buchanan in their Ervin
Committee testimony. Id. at 872, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,052, as well as the files of
John Dean, Charles Colson, H. R. Haldeman, John Erhlichman, John Caulfield and others.
Id. at 869 n.11, 1974-1 US. Tax Cas. at 83,050 n.11. In a second search, special counsel to
the President did search some of these fies, seeking documents relevant to the plaintiff,
White House interest in tax-exempt status of left-wing activist organizations, and several
other related areas, but found "no documents so relating." Id. at 870 n.14 and accompanying
text, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,050.
The IRS also failed to comply by searching its own files for "materials referring to
White House interest in, concern with, or intervention in the decisions or actions of the
Internal Revenue Service or the Treasury Department on tax-exempt organizations, including the granting or withholding of tax exemption rulings or the conducting of audits .. "
Id. at 870, 1974-1 US. Tax Cas. at 83,050. In addition, the IRS failed to fully comply with
interrogatories in substance or as to deadlines, which the court characterized as "another
example of the Defendants' efforts to evade the Court's orders." Id, at 872, 1974-1 US.
Tax Cas. at 83,052.
172. For text of FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), see note 117 supra. The court also requested
the White House tape of a conversation between the President, Mr. Dean, and Mr. Haldeman regarding the use of the IRS against White House "enemies." Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt,
Special Counsel to the President, stated that he was authorized to advise the Court that
the White House was claiming executive privilege. 368 F. Supp. at 872, 1974-1 US. Tax
Cas. at 83,053. However, the court ruled that only the President could make a formal claim.
Id. at 872-3, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,053 (citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 US. 1,
7-8 (1954) and Nixon v. Sirica & Cox, 487 F.2d 700, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The court held
that this failure to comply without proper claim of executive privilege was also grounds
for imposing rule 37(b)(2) sanctions (citing O'Neill v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 827, 830
(E.D. Pa. 1948)). 368 F. Supp. at 873, 1974-1 US. Tax Cas. at 83,053. See generally, Note,
supra note 154, at 171-74.
173. Plaintiff's primary allegation was that it was denied a favorable tax exempt ruling
because it was singled out for special treatment for political and other reasons having no
bearing on the statutes and regulations. 368 F. Supp. at 871 n.17, 1974-1 US. Tax Cas. at
84,051 n.17.
174. Id. at 875, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,053. The court noted that plaintiff would
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Center on Corporate Responsibility illustrates the complexity of problems
which may arise when broad discovery is granted, particularly when government documents are involved. Understandably, the courts are hesitant to
grant such discovery without substantial evidence indicating extreme
necessity." 5 Such necessity is seldom recognized in the summons enforcement
1
proceeding. 76
A possible compromise to the problems surrounding the production of
government documents is an in camera inspection of the documents by the
court. Arguably, this limited disclosure would protect the government's
justifiable interest in maintaining confidentiality in its records while providing evidence enabling the court to decide whether to grant or deny discovery
of the documents.' 77 Although the in camera examination has been used in
7 9
some instances," 78 courts still require a strong showing of improper purposeY.
The courts could require a lesser showing of improper purpose to order this
limited examination. The in camera inspection would then provide a tenable
solution to the circular situation occuring when a taxpayer cannot show
evidence of improper purpose without access to such documents and the court
is hesitant to grant access without some evidence of improper purpose.
The LaSalle ruling could produce an increase in requests to examine
governmental documents since examination represents the most expedient and
trustworthy method of determining the institutional purpose of the IRS. Because a deposition of the special agent who issued the summons is of limited
value under LaSalle, the taxpayer will inevitably look to a more direct
method of uncovering purpose and thereby demonstrating a lack of good
faith. 8 0 Although the interrogatory might provide the same information, IRS
have been entitled to a favorable ruling even if political intervention had not been
established, because it met all requirements. Id.
175. See note 153 supra. In some other areas of the law extensive discovery, often including government documents, has been routinely ordered. In the antitrust area, the
lengthy discovery procedures which have sometimes dragged on for years have caused
judicial concern. See Note, Improved Definition of Discovery Relevance: A Path Out of

the Antitrust Quagmire, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 751 (1978).
176. Generally, an individual taxpayer would not need such extensive discovery. It
could, however, become more necessary when the taxpayer under investigation is a large
corporation or a political organization, or other large group. Examples of such entities
which appear in this work are the Church of Scientology (see text accompanying notes 131134 supra); Center on Corporate Responsibility (see text accompanying notes 164-174 supra);
Tax Reform Research Group (see note 152 supra); and General Motors Corp. (see notes
197-200 infra and accompanying text).
177. A new provision of the FOIA authorizes in camera examination of documents to
determine whether FOIA exceptions apply. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1977).
178. See, e.g., United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1972-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. 9168 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Duke, 379 F. Supp. 545, 1974-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9475 (N.D. Ill. 1974); United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9781 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
179. See cases cited note 163 supra.
180. See notes 78-80 supra. The in camera examination would be one alternative. The
district court in LaSalle did inspect the IRS investigative file in camera after refusing to
permit respondent to do so. 98 S. Ct. 2357, 2361 n.5, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 at 84,579
(1978).
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documents seem preferable and, if produced in a timely manner, more expedient. Such documents would undoubtedly be more reliable because information could easily be omitted on an interrogatory. Of course, cooperation of
the IRS is crucial to the workability of this discovery tool, and IRS resistance
might cause judicial reluctance to order such discovery.
BALANCING OF INTERMS

Several important considerations affect the court's decision on whether to
grant discovery and if so, the method and amount of discovery to allow. The
court must first recognize the duty of the IRS to administer and enforce the
internal revenue laws. Because summons enforcement is a summary proceeding,""1 the government has a justifiable interest in the expediency and avoidance of unnecessary delay that could result from lengthy discovery pro18 2
cedures
On the other hand, as expressed by a district court judge, it is a "unique
and particularly juridical task to see that precious individual rights are not
trampled in the federal bureaucracy's headlong scramble toward ever higher
levels of efficiency."' 83 In attempting to prove improper purpose, the taxpayer
assumes a heavy burden which has been continually increased by Supreme
Court decision. 8 4 Because the criminal purpose doctrine has been limited to
apply only after a referral to the Justice Department, subject to the prior
good faith requirement, it will be of small value prospectively. Generally
the referral is not made until the final stages of the investigation after the IRS
has accumulated substantial incriminating evidence. Therefore, the only remaining defense for the taxpayer is lack of institutional good faith - improper
purpose or absence of proper purpose -prior to the ultimate criminal referral. Without access to at least limited discovery, it will be nearly impossible
for the taxpayer to produce sufficient evidence of improper purpose to justify
denial of enforcement. However, before the taxpayer may be granted discovery, he must produce substantial evidence of improper purpose. 8s5 This
circuitous situation permits little chance of success in the battle against
summons enforcement. Indeed, very few taxpayers have been successful in
the endeavor. Some courts have pointed to this lack of success, often resulting
even when limited discovery was permitted, to justify a denial of discovery.18 6
181. The Donaldson Court approved the use of the summary proceeding for summons
enforcement. 400 U.S. 517, 1971-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9173 (1971).
182. See note 123 supra. See also Note, supra note 175.
183. United States v. Kessler, 364 F. Supp. 66, 69, 1973-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 9781 at 82,5a2

(S.D. Ohio 1973).
184.

For the four major Supreme Court cases which have progressively increased this

burden, see note 39 supra. See Note, supra note 72, at 265.
185. See United States v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Gas.
9235 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1972-1 U.S. Tax
Gas. 9168 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165, 1971-1 U.S. Tax as.
9329 (5th Cir. 1971).
186. See, e.g., United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 1970-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9648 (1st Cir.
1970). The Salter court stated that "taxpayers have been almost uniformly unsuccessful in
proving an 'improper purpose' defense [footnote omitted]. Requiring an evidentiary hear-
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However, these statistics may well be inconclusive and misleading because
most taxpayers are either denied discovery or limited to a deposition or
cross-examination of the special agent at the hearing. An examination of IRS
files or officials would probably reveal additional information. 8 7 There is
no way of knowing what information discovery might have produced in the
myriad of cases where none was allowed or where the taxpayer was not
allowed to intervene in the proceeding. Nonsuccess is certainly more likely
when the taxpayer has no viable means of discovering the government's
purpose.
In addition to the above considerations, the LaSalle Court saw a dangerous
potential for expansion of criminal discovery when the summons is used to
determine civil liability during a criminal investigation.'5 1 The Constitution
provides for the grand jury as an iavestigative and accusatory body. 8 9 If the
IRS oversteps its prescribed authority it may, thereby, usurp the authority of
the grand jury without any of the traditional safeguards against investigatory
abuse that operate in the grand jury context. 190 The LaSalle majority noted
that the IRS cannot try its own prosecutions and that "[n]othing in section
7602 or its legislative history suggests that Congress intended the summons
authority to broaden the Justice Department's right of criminal litigation discovery or to infringe on the role of the grand jury as a principal tool of
criminal accusation."' 9' For this reason, the Court terminated the summons
authority at the point of referral to the Justice Department.' 92 The Court
ing will not preclude a respondent from raising and proving a 'improper purpose,' and we
of course have no intention of precluding him from doing so. But we feel that the hearing
requirement will have the salutary effect of eliminating discovery in cases in which it is
clear that respondent will not be able to prove his allegations." Id. at 701, 1970-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. at 84,644.
187. The special agent may lack authority to reveal certain information. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wright Motor Co., Inc., 536 F.2d 1090, 1976-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19605 (5th
Cir. 1976) (special agent refused to answer questions on deposition pursuant to orders
from his supervisor). See notes 116-118 supra and accompanying text. Another impediment
to discovery by deposition is the issuing agent's possible bias concerning summons enforcement.
188. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'1 Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 2365, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
at 84,582 (1978); Abel v. United States, 262 U.S. 217, 226 (1960) (in case involving use
of administrative warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service, Court stated that
"[t]he deliberate use by the Government of an administrative warrant for the purpose of
gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet stern resistance by the courts.").
189. Brief for Respondent at 16, United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. 2357, 19782 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978).
190. See Note, supranote 1, at 534.
191. 98 S. Ct. at 2365, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582. See United States v. Morgan
Guar. Trust Co., 572 F.2d 36, 41-42, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 83,428 (2d. Cir. 1978) ("[the]
only rationale that has ever been offered for preventing an otherwise legitimate use of an
Internal Revenue Service third party summons, [is] that Congress could not have intended
the statute to trench on the power of the grand jury or to broaden the Government's
right to discovery in a criminal case."). Accord, United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454,
458-59, 1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9210 at 80,369-70 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. O'Connor,
118 F. Supp. 248, 250-51, 1953-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9591 at 48,614 (D. Mass. 1953).
192. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 2365, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at
84,582.
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suggested that although cooperation between the IRS and the Justice Department on the calculation of civil tax liability might be expected, an attempt
to build a "partial information barrier" between the two executive branches
would be unrealistic. Therefore, effective use of information to determine civil
liability would "inevitably result in criminal discovery."'193 The Court admitted
that the potential for expanding criminal discovery rights of the Justice Department or of usurping the role of the grand jury existed even at the
point of recommendation by the special agent to his superior. The majority
felt, however, that this possibility of abuse was remote before a formal recommendation to the Justice Department occurred and therefore did not warrant
banning summons use before that point. 194 Nevertheless, this appears to be
an inherent danger even prior to the referral because the summons is used
almost exclusively in investigations with criminal overtones.
Diametrically opposed is the view that the IRS and the Justice Department
must necessarily exchange information. 195 To a limited extent, this occurs
regularly when the IRS uncovers information indicating tax fraud and turns
it over to the Justice Department, which convenes a grand jury to continue
the investigation and, if indicated, to present an indictment.96 This is a one
way flow of information, however, not involving an exchange between the two
agencies. Concededly, unlimited cooperation between the two executive
branches would probably result in an increased percentage of tax fraud convictions. However, our Constitution guarantees certain rights to the in-

dividual that provide the basis of our democracy. When various governmental branches combine efforts, this protection is jeopardized. Although enforcement of internal revenue laws is indeed a valid interest, it does not
justify such a vitiation of the individual's rights.
The potential for this type of abuse is demonstrated in a recent case involving an IRS attorney appointed to conduct a grand jury investigation of

alleged tax fraud.197 The attorney had participated in the investigation of
the taxpayer while an employee of the Internal Revenue Service and, in fact,

193. Id.
194. Id. at 2365 n.15, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582 n.15. The Court seems to make a
tenuous distinction between using civil information to determine criminal liability before

the referral to the Justice Department and using it after the referral. It states that before
the referral the possibility for abuse is "remote," but afterward, it is "inevitable." id. at

2365 & n.15, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,582 & n.15.
195.

See General Motors Corp. v. United States (In re April 1977 Grand Jury subpoenas),

573 F.2d 936, 947, 1978-1 US. Tax Cas. %9413 at 84,096 (6th Cir.) (Merrit, J., dissenting), appeal dismissed, 584 F.2d 1366, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19692 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
196. Id. The dissent suggests that to continue this cooperation by "deputizing" an IRS
attorney familiar with the facts to participate in the grand jury investigation would be a
"natural, not a sinister, sequence of events." Id. See notes 197-200 infra and accompanying
text.

197. General Motors Corp. v. United States (In re April, 1977 Grand Jury subpoenas),
573 F.2d 936, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9413 (6th Cir. 1978), appeal dismissed, 584 F.2d 1366,
1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9692 (6th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (after case was decided on the merits,
Sixth Circuit en banc vacated panel opinion and dismissed GM's interlocutory appeal as
improvidently granted, based on lack of appellate jurisdiction).
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continued to be employed by the IRS. 198 The court found the appointment to
199
As justification,
be a conflict of interest resulting in an ethical violation.
the court stated that "Congress has granted to IRS adequate powers of investigation ...and it should not be necessary for IRS to conduct a grand jury
investigation in order to obtain evidence for its use in civil cases." ' 20 0
Although the IRS has a statutory duty to investigate fraud,201 the congressionally authorized purpose of the summons is not to aid in the prosecution of tax law violations but rather, "[flor the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or
...
202 While upholding the right of the IRS
collecting any such liability.
to issue the summons when criminality is suspected, the courts frequently
recognize the statutory authority of the IRS to investigate allegedly fraudulent
or criminal activities. 20 However, the courts rarely note that the language of
section 7602 authorizing issuance of the summons makes no reference to its
use in criminal investigations. 20 4 Congress has granted to the IRS and Department of Justice the specific authority necessary to accomplish their separate
purposes. Thus, their powers should not overlap any more than is required
to achieve each distinct function.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATiv.ES

Recognizing the inherent danger of abuse in the use of the IRS summons,
198. Id. at 938, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Gas. at 84,089. This case arose from the 1975 audit
of GM's 1972 tax returns and concerned GM's deductions from income of the cost of
expense materials (materials which are used in production but do not become part of
the finished product) when purchased. GM conducted a survey to determine its inventory
expense as requested by the IRS. The IRS, however, questioned its accuracy and believed
GM employees had falsified the survey. GM contended that IRS agents visited its plants
and "berated" GM employees, using abusive tactics.
Believing the survey to be false, the IRS turned the investigation over to the Intelligence
Division, which began requesting GM records and documents. When certain records were
not produced, the IRS turned the case over to the Justice Department, which convened a
grand jury. It was at this point that the Justice Department designated Piliaris, an
attorney and accountant employed by the IRS, as a special attorney for the United States
to assist in conducting the grand jury proceeding. Piliaris was familiar with the GM
tax investigation and, in fact, had drafted the letter referring the case to the Justice Department for prosecution. He remained on the IRS payroll. Id. at 938-39, 1978-1 U.S. Tax
Cas, at 84,088-89.
199. Id. at 942-44, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,092-94. The court noted that even if no
actual conflict existed, any appearance of impropriety violates Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Id.
200.
201.

Id. at 942, 1978-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 84,092.
See note 25 supra and accompanying text.

202. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, §3G14, 53 Stat. 438. This is a statutory predecessor
of I.R.C. §7602. The legislative committees stated that they intended "no material change
from existing law" when enacting the 1954 codification of I.R.C. §7602. H.R. REP. No.
1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A436 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 617 (1954),
reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. 8c AD. NEws 4025.
203. See United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 98 S. Ct. at 264, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
at 84,581-82 (1978).
204. For text of I.R.C. §7602, see note 7 supra.
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the Administrative Conference of the United States suggested as one solution
that special agents be permitted to issue a summons only when the purpose is
primarily civil.205 They would be required to obtain a court issued subpoena
or search warrant for primarily criminal investigations. This proposal offers
the taxpayer protection against arbitrary issuance. Also, the taxpayer, unaware
of the government's interest in his suspected criminal violations and perhaps
also unaware of his right to refuse compliance with the summons pending a
court order, would be provided additional protection.2 06 On the other hand,
this approach might unduly hinder the IRS in its investigative capacity and
207
overburden the courts with additional procedural matters.
A compromise approach would require the special agent to discuss the
individual case with and request approval from his immediate supervisor before
issuing a summons. The agent might also be required to obtain approval
from a higher IRS representative such as the District Chief of Intelligence or
the Regional Director. 208 These proposals would provide some protection
against arbitrary or impulsive summons issuance without subjecting the IRS
to a time consuming judicial procedure.
A less burdensome alternative proposed by the Conference suggests that
9
the summoned party be apprised of his rights and of available alternatives.20
The IRS already requires that special agents advise individuals at the outset
of an official interview of their fifth amendment rights and of their right
to counsel. 210 Providing additional information concerning alternatives would
205. Note, supra note 1, at 539 & n.131 (citing
UNITED STATES,

REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE

ADMINISTRATr

CONFERENCE OF THE

PROCEDURES OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE

SERVICE,

S. Doc. No. 266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 751 (1975)).
206. See Lipton, Constitutional Rights in Criminal Tax Investigations, 45 F.R.D. 323

(1968).
207. See generally Note, supra note 110. With the large number of IRS summons enforcement proceedings, courts would be kept quite busy issuing such subpoenas. This could
lead to the procedure becoming automatic upon the IRS's recommendation and the conse-

quent frustration of the plan.
208. Under IRS administrative policy, where a third party summons is served, advance
supervisory approval is required. S. REP. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 307 (1976), 1976-3
C.B. 367, reprinted in 4 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3203.
209. There has been much litigation and commentary regarding the applicability of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to IRS proceedings. The Court has ruled that
Miranda rights need not be given absent an arrest. See United States v. Habig, 474 F.2d 57,
1973-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Kohatsu v. United
States, 351 F.2d 898, 1965-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9715 (9th Cir. 1965); United States v. Sclafani,
265 F.2d 408, 1959-1 U.S. Tax Cas. t9357 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918 (1959); Duke,
supra note 1, at 37-41.
210. The Internal Revenue Manual Handbook for Special Agents 242.13 (1977) provides:
"Duty to inform individual of his constitutional rights. 242.131 GENERAL; Special
agents must abide by the instructions of IRM 9384 and any related Manual Supplements
relative to advising individuals of their constitutional rights. 242.132 NON-CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS; (1) At the outset of the first official interview with the subject of

an investigation, the special agent will properly identify himself/herself as a special agent
of the Internal Revenue Service and will produce his/her authorized credential to the

subject for examination. He/she will also state "As a special agent, one of my functions is
to investigate the possibility of criminal violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, and
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curtail governmental evidence gathering before the taxpayer is fully aware of
211
his rights and his option to refuse compliance pending court enforcement.
Unfortunately, these suggestions would not help the taxpayer during the
enforcement proceeding when facing the problem of obtaining evidence
showing that the IRS did not issue the summons in good faith.
SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR ORDERING DIscovERY

Due process should require an evidentiary hearing with sufficient taxpayer discovery to disclose any existing evidence indicating lack of good faith
or government failure to meet the Powell criteria for proper purpose. Discovery could be limited to a specific length of time, determined on a case-by212
An extension could be granted by
case basis, to avoid unnecessary delay.
suggested by the Fifth Circuit in
as
the court when appropriate. Conversely,
21 3
curtail discovery if abused.
could
United States v. Roundtree, the court
The amount of discovery which should be granted presents another
judicial concern. The ultimate goal is to find the measure of discovery
reasonably calculated to expose any improper purpose or absence of proper
purpose without unduly hampering IRS functions. Even if the courts adopted
a rule of reasonableness, the determination of how much discovery214is "reasonable" is difficult because it is subject to differing interpretations.
Courts might begin by granting the taxpayer discovery designed to produce sufficient evidence to indicate any improper governmental purpose. The
court could separate the cases involving political figures or organizations from
those involving the ordinary taxpayer. Those in the former category would
related offenses. (2) The special agent will then advise the subject of the investigation
substantially as follows: 'In connection with my investigation of your (or another person's)
tax liability . . . I would like to ask you some questions. However, first I advise you that
under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States I cannot compel you
to answer any questions or to submit any information if such answers or information might
tend to incriminate you in any way. I also advise you that anything which you say and any
information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal proceeding which
may be undertaken. I advise you further that you may, if you wish, seek the assistance
of an attorney before responding.'"
In some cases where the agent did not follow the provisions, courts have held that the
manual is merely directory. See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 379 F. Supp. 545, 1974-1 U.S.
1974).
Tax Gas. 9475 (N.D. Ill.
211. The legislative history of I.R.C. §7609 regarding the third party summons, states
that the committee expects the IRS to prepare a summary of the noticee's rights in layman's
language which will be enclosed with each copy of the certified notice. Thus taxpayers and
other noticees should not inadvertently lose their right to intervention. S. REP. No. 94-938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess., (1976), 1976-3 C.B. 367, reprinted in [1976] 4 U.S. CoDE CONc. & AD.
NEws 3204.
212. In United States v. Nunnally, 278 F. Supp. 843, 1968-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9320 (W.D.
Tenn. 1968), depositions and interrogatories were authorized for a period of three weeks.
In some instances this might be sufficient, whereas other situations might require six months
or more.
213. 420 F.2d 845, 1969-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9733 (5th Cir. 1969). See notes 112-115 supra and
accompanying text.
214. However, the "reasonable man" standard is frequently used in law; therefore,
"reasonableness" is not impossible to determine.
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generally need broader discovery due to the increased likelihood of an improper purpose. 215 In a case involving the average taxpayer where there is no
immediate indication of improper purpose, different guidelines would apply.
Generally, these taxpayers would not require broad discovery. Because there
is no apparent reason to suspect improper purpose, however, it may be even
more difficult to discover one when it does in fact exist. Four primary discovery tools which could be used are: (1) deposition, (2) interrogatory, (8)
in camera examination of government documents, and (4) disclosure of
government documents to the taxpayer.
The first, deposition, or its alternative, cross-examination of the special
agent at the hearing,21 6 is of limited value to the taxpayer, particularly if
only the special agent is deposed.217 The fourth discovery device, disclosure
of IRS documents to the taxpayer, may be too broad, thus interfering with
the functioning of the Service.218 In balancing interests then, the interrogatory and the in camera inspection of government documents emerge as least
likely to cause extreme hardship for either party. Both methods are particularly promising, as previously discussed,212 to determine institutional
purpose following the LaSalle holding.
Of the two alternatives, the in camera examination appears especially advantageous as evidenced by policy underlying the current trend toward increased governmental disclosure and public access to information.220 When
the Service has issued a summons for a legitimate purpose, it should not
object to an in camera inspection of relevant documents but should welcome
this means of expediting the summary proceeding while protecting its records
from public disclosure. Additionally, the in camera examination is much less
burdensome to the taxpayer than the interrogatory22 ' and is more likely to
reveal the true purpose of the IRS summons. 22 If the relevant documents are
readily produced, the district court judge should have all information necessary
to quickly dispose of the matter by enforcing the summons or authorizing
further discovery. Use of the in camera examination procedure should more

215.

See, e.g., United States v. Fensterwald, 553 F.2d 231, 1977-1 U.S. Tax Cas.

9266

(D.C. Cir. 1977), see notes 143-147 supra.
216. See notes 119-130 supra and accompanying text.
217. This follows from the LaSalle holding that institutional purpose is dispositive
rather than the personal motive of the special agent. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank,
98 S. Ct. 2357, 1978-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9501 (1978).
218. See text accompanying note 151 supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 143-150 supra and 177-179 supra.

220. See text accompanying notes 157-162 supra.
221. An interrogatory necessitates determinations of the questions to ask to best elicit
the information needed and to whom the interrogation should be directed. The latter
may be particularly difficult because the structure of the IRS and the specific individuals

within the Service are not generally known to the average taxpayer. On the other hand, it
would be a simple matter to request an in camera examination of all records, files, and

documents relevant to the taxpayer under investigation.
222. If all relevant documents are produced, they should present much dearer evidence
of IRS purpose than testimony of one or two agents who would probably not be among

the higher IRS officials and might not be aware of the total institutional purpose.
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